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ABSTRACT:
In my rst essay, I explain the rise of transferable managerial skills in the CEO market. I show that
growing competition in the product markets is a key factor driving the increased importance of CEOs’
transferable managerial skills, specically industry-transferable skills. To rule out the endogeneity of
CEO-rm matching, I exploit the exogenous shocks of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) of 1989 and the deregulatory policy in the 1990s. I show that CEOs with these skills outperform
in competitive markets and are a good match for rms’ innovation-based competition strategy.
In my second essay, we explain why rms in the same board-interlock networks tend to have similar
corporate governance practices. Specically, we utilize a novel instrument based on staggered adop-
tions of universal demand laws across states to identify causal peer eects in rms’ decisions to adopt
various governance provisions. We nd that a rm’s propensity to adopt these provisions increases
after other rms in the same board interlock network choose to adopt similar policies. The impact
of universal demand laws on the incentives faced by directors as they seek to maximize their career
outcomes is a likely mechanism explaining these eects.
In my third essay, I identify the eects of the gender of CEOs’ ospring on corporate performance.
First, acquisitions, debt and equity oerings made by CEOs with more daughters are better received by
the market. Second, CEOs with more daughters are less likely to overpay the targets, and better use
newly raised capital. Third, CEOs’ daughter(s) decrease(s) corporate litigation risk. In sum, the gender
of a child is arguably a random and natural experiment, which shows a clear eect on CEOs’ behavior.
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Chapter 1: CEOs as Jacks of All Trades. Do Executives with Multi-
Industry Experience Help Firms Compete?
1 Introduction
This paper explains the rising importance of industry-transferable skills over industry-specic skills
in the market for chief executive ocers (CEOs) over the last several decades. Top executives today
tend to acquire business education, move across rms, and gain experience in multiple industries over
the course of their career (Bertrand, 2009; Frydman, 2014). According to Lazear (2005), a chief executive
ocer should act as "a jack of all trades" who coordinates other employees with specialized skills. To
play that role, top managers need transferable managerial skills rather than specic technical skills.
Custódio et al. (2013, 2015) show that CEOs possessing transferable skills outperform in managing
complex tasks and in generating innovations. Murphy and Zabojnik (2004, 2007) and Frydman and Saks
(2010) argue that the rising importance of transferable skills explains the surge in CEO compensation.
While this is an important trend, interestingly, no economic explanation has been made according to
the best of my knowledge.
In the same period, competition has increased as a result of international trade liberalization (e.g. Ty-
bout, 2003; Bernard et al., 2006), deregulation (e.g. Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; Irvine and Ponti, 2009),
and lower business operating costs in general. Motivated by previous studies on the impacts of com-
petition on corporate structure and operations (e.g. Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010; Cuñat and Guadalupe,
2009), I ask: Did increased competition induce the rise of industry-transferable skills in the market for
CEOs? I nd that it does. When competition increases, rms are more likely to retain incumbent CEOs
who have greater industry-transferable skills. If companies replace the incumbent CEOs, the incoming
CEOs tend to have greater industry-transferable skills than the departing ones. Further, CEOs with
these skills outperform when the market becomes more competitive.
Consider Louis Gerstner, IBM’s chief executive ocer from 1993 to 2002. Gerstner, formerly CEO of
RJR Nabisco, was a senior manager at American Express and McKinsey & Company in his earlier career.
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In April 1993, Mr. Gerstner took the position of chairperson and CEO at IBM to replace John F. Akers,
who had spent his entire career at IBM. The company, once a dominant player in the personal computer
(PC) market, faced intense competition from low-cost PC producers. Gerstner rst decided to exit the
retail desktop PC market and to enter the market of complete IT solutions and system integration.
During his tenure, IBM’s market capitalization grew from around $30 billion to nearly $200 billion.
Coming from unrelated industries, CEOs like Louis Gerstner brought transferable managerial skills,
such as leadership, restructuring abilities, nancial knowledge, and organizational skills to their new
position.
Increased competition could raise the demand for industry-transferable skills for two reasons. First,
in a competitive market, innovation allows rms to dierentiate their products and services. Studies
in economics and industrial organization have identied the link between innovation and the intensity
of competition in the product markets. Schumpeter (1912), Aghion et al. (1999), and Knott and Posen
(2003) show that innovation is more likely in competitive industries. This growth strategy requires that
business leaders have the abilities and willingness to engage in risky but innovative projects. Compared
with industry-specic skills, industry-transferable skills provide CEOs with more career outside options
and thus both greater abilities and willingness to engage in breakthrough projects (Custódio et al., 2015).
Hence, the demand for CEOs with industry-transferable skills would naturally go up when rms face
higher product-market competition.
Second, the demand for CEOs’ transferable skills could come from the attened structure of U.S.
rms. Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) show that this change in the corporate structure itself came from
rising competition in the product markets. To manage atter corporations, CEOs need to process in-
formation from dierent corporate areas quickly and to coordinate division managers with greater
authority and division-specic knowledge. This development requires CEOs to have broad business
experience and naturally leads to higher demand for CEOs with transferable managerial skills.
To examine how the market for CEOs responds to increased competition, I exploit three dierent
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settings: rm xed eects models; within-rm variation models with a quasi-natural experiment (the
Canada-United States FTA of 1989); and deregulation policies in the 1990s.
First, I link CEO outcomes to measure of competition in a rm xed eects setting. My measure for
industry competition is based on two Herndahl-Hirschman Indices (HHI), one calculated using SIC
three-digit industries and the other based on the variable industry classication suggested by Hoberg
and Phillips (2011). My measure of industry-transferable skills (Multi-Industry Experience) equals the
number of industries at the SIC three-digit level where a manager worked before taking a CEO position.
I nd that incumbent CEOs possessing greater industry-transferable skills are less likely to be replaced
but that this eect is only strong when competition is high. When competition is one standard deviation
below average, an increase of one standard deviation in Multi-Industry Experience reduces the propen-
sity of CEO turnovers by 1.9 percentage points. When competition is one standard deviation higher
than the mean level, the eects of one standard deviation in Multi-Industry Experience increases to 2.9
percentage points. This eect is economically large when compared with the average CEO turnover
rate of 8 percent.
When rms in competitive markets decide to replace the current CEOs, executives with greater
industry-transferable skills are more likely to be selected. Specically, when the competition measure
increases by one standard deviation, the industry transferable skill measure, Multi-Industry Experience,
increases from 0.08 to 0.16 of a standard deviation. Moreover, I nd some evidence that CEOs who have
industry-transferable skills outperform when competition increases.
Executives are not randomly assigned to rms, but matched with rms to maximize the executives’
career objectives and the companies’ corporate outcomes. This endogeneity is a major obstacle to
estimating how CEO skills aect outcomes (see, for example, Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Fee et al., 2013).
For instance, to protect its market position, a rm may increase investment in intellectual properties,
raise customer loyalty, and increase customer switching costs. In such a case, the rms’ competition
strategy could explain both their CEO selection and rms’ performance.
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To overcome this identication challenge, my second approach combines the within-rm variation
of segment data with a quasi-natural experiment, the Canada-United States FTA of 1989. Following the
passage of the agreement, all tari barriers between the two countries were eliminated (Treer, 2004).
Thus, an industry which was protected by a higher tari rate in the pre-FTA period would face a larger
increase in competition in the post-FTA period. This allows me to use the pre-FTA tari rates as a
measure of heterogeneous treatment eects of the FTA on dierent industries.
Segment data allow me to assess the impacts of CEO’s industry-transferable skills on the perfor-
mance of a more aected segment, relative to his/her eects on the performance of a less aected one
within the same rm-year. The within-rm variation of segment data enables me to identify the eects
by including rm-year xed eects in my models. As the xed eects absorb all rm and CEO unobserv-
ables, my estimation cannot be aected by CEO-rm matching decisions made at the rm level. Chief
executives who have greater industry-transferable skills are more successful in maintaining revenue
growth and protability than ones who have lesser industry-transferable skills; and crucially, the eects
are stronger in segments which were more exposed to the FTA after the passage of the trade agreement.
My results are robust to the inclusion of dierent xed eects and control variables for CEO and rm
characteristics. Consistent with results in the rst setting, I also nd that increased international com-
petition causes companies to retain and to recruit CEOs who have greater industry-transferable skills.
Third, I examine the eects of product-market deregulation. I analyze two important deregulations
in the 1990s: the National Energy Act of 1992 in the electricity sector and the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 in the telecommunications industry (Andrade et al., 2001; London, 2004; Irvine and Ponti,
2009). Consistent with previous results, CEOs with greater industry-transferable skills are more likely
to be retained after deregulation. In the telecommunications sector, CEOs possessing greater industry-
transferable skills achieve higher revenue and prot growth in deregulated industries.
In my analysis of the mechanisms, I nd that CEOs with greater industry-transferable skills to
undertake innovative but risky projects more when market competition increases. CEOs who have
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these skills tend to pursue riskier but more innovative projects by investing more in Research and
Development (R&D). My analysis further indicates that CEOs’ industry-transferable skills positively
impact innovative activities by generating more patents and citations. Both eects are stronger in
industries facing higher competition.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst paper explaining the rising trend toward transferable
managerial skills in the market for CEOs. The literature has documented the trend but not explained
what drive it. Murphy and Zabojnik (2007), and Lazear (2005) suggest that modern-day entrepreneurs
tend to possess transferable managerial skills. Custódio et al. (2013, 2015) show that the market com-
pensates more for CEOs who have these skills. Transferable managerial skills have increased in value
over the last several decades; rms are more likely to choose external candidates for the CEO position
now than they were several decades ago (Huson et al., 2001; Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007; Frydman,
2014). My paper identies increased competition as a key force behind this movement in the CEO
market.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the data, empirical strategy
and main results for the rm xed-eects models. Section 3 discusses the institutional background of
the Canada-United States FTA and presents my empirical strategy. Section 4, I discuss the set of tests
under the setting of deregulation. I conclude in Section 5.
2 Firm Fixed-Eects Models
The trend toward transferable managerial skills in the market for CEOs has started since at least
30-40 years ago (Bertrand, 2009). In this part, I estimate rm xed-eects models to examine the role of
product-market competition in this trend. To measure variation in competition from various sources, I
construct variable, Competition, based on the HHI. This index, as a measure of competition, was found
in industrial organization theory and is widely used in economic literature (Curry and George, 1983;
Tirole, 1988). Moreover, this analysis allows me to generalize ndings in this paper by using a recent
sample of CEOs from 1999 to 2012.
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I rst document a trend toward CEOs with greater industry-transferable skills in competitive indus-
tries. To illustrate this trend, Figure 1 plots the HHI and CEOs’Multi-Industry Experience. Both variables
are weighted by total assets. The HHI is calculated using Compustat revenue for non-nancial indus-
tries at the SIC-three digit level in the period from 1985 to 2012. The graph presents opposite trends
in the HHI, lower/higher HHI means higher/lower competition, and CEOs’ Multi-Industry Experience.
These trends were strongest in the 1980s and 1990s reecting the signicant increase in product-market
competition as a result of deregulatory policies and trade liberalization in this period. Since early 2000s,
the trends in both competition and CEOs’ Multi-Industry Experience have been weaker. This gure sug-
gests a positive correlation between product-market competition and the demand for CEOs possessing
industry-transferable skills.
[Figure 1 about here]
2.1. Data Description
Industry Transferable Skills - I choose Multi-Industry Experience, the number of industries at the SIC
three-digit level in which an executive has experience before taking a CEO position, to be the measure
of industry-transferable skills. This measure is constructed using BoardEx database. I start with all
directors who have held CEO title according to BoardEx.1 The database provides directors’ biography
which contains the name, past positions, start time, and end time for each position. To obtain rms’ SIC
code, I match companies in the biographies to CRSP using CUSIP. For the rms which are not included
in CRSP, I look up their SIC codes in a company information database, www.buzzfile.com. As
executives can increase their human capital in response to changes in the market for CEOs, reverse
causality is a concern in constructing this measure. To minimize this concern, I exclude from the mea-
sure all positions such as board seats or advisory positions at other rms after an executive has taken a
CEO position. The measure Multi-Industry Experience, therefore, is constant during each CEO tenure.
1 A conditition for CEOs to be reported in BoardEx is that the CEOs must hold positions in public rms in 1999. Analyses
using BoardEx for pre-1999 periods is potentially subjected to this survivorship bias. Therefore, my analysis in this part only
use the sample of CEOs in the post-1999 period.
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For the convenient interpretation of the results, variable Multi-Industry Experience is standardized to
have mean zero and standard deviation one.
Product Market Competition - In this setting, I dene the competition measure, Competition, as one
minus the HHI. I estimate the HHI using two methods: the Compustat HHI at the SIC three-digit
industry level and the TNIC3 HHI suggested by Hoberg and Phillips (2011).2 For the Compustat HHI, I
group rms into industries according to their pre-assigned SIC codes, then, calculate the index using the
companies’ annual revenue. The Compustat HHI provides a yearly measure of competition intensity.
One shortcoming of the Compustat HHI is that companies are rarely reassigned new SIC code when
the rms enter a new industry. To overcome this issue, Hoberg and Phillips (2011) suggests classifying
rms using the product description taken from rms’ SEC lings. According to their method, rms
with similar product descriptions are more likely to compete in the same industry. Since rms update
the product description in their lings annually, this classication accounts for the movement of a rm
across industries. In both methods, the HHI ranges between zero, for most competitive industries, and
one, for least competitive industries.
Innovation - I construct two measures for corporate innovation using the NBER Patent Citation
database created by Hall et al. (2001). The sample period is from 1999 to 2006. The rst measure is
the number of patent applications that are led in a year and eventually granted to a rm. To assess
the importance of the patents, the second measure is the number of citations that a company’s patents
receive each year. These measures are subject to two truncation problems in the NBER database. The
rst problem arises since the database only reports patent applications after the patents are granted. On
average, the lag between patents’ application year and grant year is about two years. Hence, patents,
applied before 2006 but granted in later years, do not show up in the sample. The second problem
arises as a patent may receive citations for many years but the database only reports the citations up to
2006. Follow Hall et al. (2001), I estimate the patent application-grant distribution and the citation-lag
distribution to correct for the truncation problems in the number of patents and citations.
2 I thank Gerard Hoberg and Gordon Phillips for making the index publicly available
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Control variables for CEO characteristics such as age, externally versus internally hired, and edu-
cation are collected from BoardEx. Firm accounting variables are collected from Compustat and win-
sorized at 1 percent and 99 percent levels. Panel A of Table 1 reports the statistics of the main dependent
and independent variables in this setting.
[Table 1 about here]
2.2. Empirical Analysis and Results
In the rst set of tests, I examine whether increased competition would aect rms’ decision to
retain incumbent CEOs if the chief executives possess industry-transferable skills. I create a dummy
variable, CEO Turnover, which equals to one if a CEO is replaced at the end of the nancial year and
equals to zero, otherwise. In the models, I regress CEO Turnover on the competition measure, CEOs’
industry-transferable skills, the interaction of the two variables, rm xed eects, and year xed eects.
The estimated coecient on the interaction term shows the eects of CEOs’ industry-transferable skills
on the propensity of CEO turnovers when competition increases. The regression equation is as follows:
(1)
CEO Turnoveri,j,t = α+ β1Competitionj,t ×Multi-Industry Experiencei,t
+ β2Competitionj,t + β3Multi-Industry Experiencei + β4CEO Controlsi,t
+ FirmFEj + YearFEt + i,j,t
If industry-transferable skills lower the turnover propensity of CEOs in a competitive market, the
coecient on the interaction term should be negative and signicant. Table 2 reports the results of these
models. In Columns (1) to (2), Competition is based on the Compustat HHI; in Columns (3) and (4), the
variable is based on the TNIC3 HHI. The coecient of the interaction term is negative and signicant
at the 10 percent level in the rst model and the 5 percent level in the remaining three models. When
competition is one standard deviation below average, an increase of one standard deviation in Multi-
Industry Experience reduces the propensity of CEO turnovers by 1.9 percentage points (equals to the
sum of β1 and β3). When competition is one standard deviation higher than the mean level, the eects
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of one standard deviation in Multi-Industry Experience increases to 2.9 percentage points. Compared
with the average CEO turnover rate of 8 percent, these results indicates a large impact of industry-
transferable skills and product-market competition on CEOs’ turnover propensity.
[Table 2 about here]
Next, I check whether increased competition would make rms choose executives with greater
industry-transferable skills when the rms decide to replace the incumbent ones. Specically, I regress
my measure Multi-Industry Experience on Competition, rm xed eects, and year xed eects. A
possible concern in this test is that my results could be driven by other CEO characteristics that are
correlated with industry-transferable skills. To address this concern, I estimate similar models in which
other CEO characteristics are regressed on Competition. The concern is negligible if the coecient on
Competition is insignicant in these models.
Since most of these CEO characteristics only vary when CEO turnovers happen, the sample for
these tests consists of the rst year when an executive takes a CEO position. For example, CEO A joint
Firm 1 in 2000 and is replaced by CEO B in 2007. In my sample, Firm 1 provides two observations.
When I include rm xed eects, the estimated coecient of Multi-Industry Experience on Competition
indicates how much the dierence in Multi-Industry Experience between CEO A and CEO B could be
explained by the dierence in variable Competition of Firm 1 between 2000 and 2007. In the 1999-2012
period, there are 5,464 CEOs in my sample. The coecient on variable Competition should be positive
and signicant if increased competition drives up the demand for CEOs’ industry-transferable skills.
Table 3 reports results of these models. Panels A and B present the results of regression models
in which variable Competition is based on the Compustat HHI and TNIC3 HHI, respectively. Column
(1) of both panels shows that the growth in Competition is positively correlated with the increase in
CEOs’ Multi-Industry Experience. The coecient is positive and signicant at the 1 and 5 percent levels.
The magnitude of the coecient is signicantly large, one standard deviation increase in industry
competition explains from 0.08 to 0.16 standard deviation increase in CEOs’ industry-transferable skills.
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These results indicate that rms choose executives possessing greater industry-transferable skills when
they replace their incumbent CEOs.
In Column (3) of panel A, the coecient on Competition is positive and signicant at the 10 percent
level. I expect this result since the number of industries and the number of rms that an executive gains
experience in are highly correlated. The correlation between these two variables is 0.73 in my sample.
However, when Competition is measured base on TNIC3 HHI, Column (3) in panel B, the coecient
is insignicant. In the remaining Columns, the coecient is insignicantly dierent from zero. These
tests indicate that other CEO characteristics are unlikely to drive my results.
[Table 3 about here]
The results in Table 3 show that the intensity of competition could cause rms to select new CEOs
who have greater industry-transferable skills. My next set of tests aims at answering why CEOs with
industry-transferable skills are preferred in a competitive market. My conjecture is that industry-
transferable skills allow CEOs to outperform when competition intensies. To test this hypothesis, I
regress four measures of rm performance the logarithm of revenue, the logarithm of operating prot,
return on assets (ROA), and Tobin’s Q on Competition, Multi-Industry Experience, the interaction of the
two variables, rm xed eects, and year xed eects. If CEOs’ industry-transferable skills positively
aect rms’ performance in a competitive market, the coecient on the interaction term should be pos-
itive and statistically signicant. Table 4 reports the results of these regressions. Out of the four models,
the estimated coecient in the models for ROA is positive and signicant at the 5 percent level. In an
average competition market, greater CEOs’ industry-transferable skills, one standard deviation higher
in Multi-Industry Experience, do not have signicant impacts on rms’ performance. However, in a high
competition market, one standard deviation higher in Competition, greater CEOs’ industry-transferable
skills positively impact rms’ performance. One standard deviation higher in Multi-Industry Experience
is correlated with a 0.4 percentage point increase in ROA. These results suggest that the positive impact
of industry-transferable skills on rm performance in a competitive market could be the underlying
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reason for the growing demand for CEOs’ industry-transferable skills.
[Table 4 about here]
2.3. Channels of Eects
When barriers to entry are removed, new entrants supply similar products and services to those
oered by existing players and drive down the average protability of the sector. To maintain monopo-
listic prot, existing rms need to raise new barriers by achieving technological patents or intellectual
properties, investing in brand identity, or increasing customer switching costs. Aghion et al. (2001) in-
dicate that competition could incentivize rms to invest in research and development (R&D) since the
incremental prots from innovating are higher in a competitive market. Executives with transferable
skills are a good match for the CEO position in such an environment. These skills have been shown
to impact rms’ innovation outputs positively. Custódio et al. (2015) nd that rms led by CEOs with
greater transferable skills generate more patents and acquire more patents through mergers and ac-
quisitions. Their patents are also more important, as measured by the number of citations, and more
exploratory (i.e., involving riskier research for new technologies) than those of rms led by CEOs with
rm-specic skills. The authors suggest that CEOs who have transferable skills could help the rms
generate more innovation since these skills reduce career risk and thereby allow them to pursue risker
but more breakthrough projects. My results in the previous tests are consistent with this argument:
as competition increases, rms tend to retain and to select executives who possess greater industry-
transferable skills for the CEO position. To further test this channel of eects, I estimate regression
models in which R&D and corporate innovation are regressed on the interaction of Competition and
Multi-Industry Experience.
[Table 5 about here]
Table 5 presents the results for research and development activities. The sample consists of non-
nancial Compustat rms from 1999 to 2012. In Column (1), R&D, normalized by revenue, is the depen-
dent variable. The results show that CEOs’ industry-transferable skills positively impact R&D in a high
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competition market. The coecient on the interaction of Competition and Multi-Industry Experience is
positive and signicant at 5 percent level. In a high competition market, an increase of one standard
deviation in CEOs’ Multi-Industry Experience leads to 1.2 percentage point increase in the R&D to rev-
enue ratio. For comparison, in Columns (2) to (4), I estimate similar models in which dierent measures
for corporate risk taking, leverage, cash holdings, and capital expenditure, are the dependent variable.
In these models, the coecient on the interaction term is statistically insignicant. The results indicate
that CEOs’ industry-transferable skills make the rms invest more in innovative activities rather than
just taking more risks in general.
Next, I test the direct eects of CEOs’ industry-transferable skills on innovation outputs, measured
by the logarithm of the number of patents and the logarithm of the number of citations, is the depen-
dent variable. Table 6 reports the results of these models. In Columns (1) and (2), the coecient on the
interaction term is positive and signicant at the 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively. In a high compe-
tition market, one standard deviation increase in CEOs’ industry-transferable skills is associated with
3.3 percent growth in the number of patents. In the models for citations, Columns (3) and (4), I obtain
similar results, one standard deviation increase in CEOs’ industry-transferable skills is associated with
6.1 to 6.3 percent growth in the number of citations. In all models, the coecient is signicant at the 5
and 10 percent levels. These results suggest that the corporate innovation channel is one mechanism
leading to the rising demand for CEOs’ industry-transferable skills in a competitive market.
[Table 6 about here]
Another possible channel of eects is through the changes in corporate structure which require
CEOs to have transferable skills. Using a proprietary dataset on the structure of 300 large U.S. rms,
Rajan and Wulf (2006) show that rms’ organizational structure has been attened. In that structure,
more managers report directly to the CEO, and the CEO delegates more authority to lower-level man-
agers. Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) use the same data and show that market competition plays a major
role in that organizational change. The ndings in these two papers suggest that modern CEOs must
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interact with more divisional employees within their rms and are likely to have a boarder set of skills.
Since a similar data on organizational structure is not available for my study, I could not directly test
this channel of eects. However, the change in corporate structure in response to increased competi-
tion also could be another channel explaining the rising importance of industry-transferable skills in
the CEO market.
3 The Canadian-United States Free Trade Agreement
In this section, I discuss the second set of analysis using the Canada-United States FTA to address
several identication concerns of rm xed-eects models. First, the actual HHI is not available for
all industries and in all years. The most precise estimate of the index, provided by the Department of
Commerce, only covers manufacturing sectors and is released every ve years. The Compustat HHI
does not include private and foreign companies. The TNIC3 HHI provides better industry classications
but, similar to the Compustat HHI, covers only public rms. Second, rm xed-eects models cannot
address rm time-variant unobservables in CEO-rm matching. This endogeneity is a major challenge
in identifying the eects of CEOs’ industry-transferable skills on companies’ performance.
To overcome these concerns, my second empirical setting takes advantage of the within-rm vari-
ation of segment data and an exogenous shock to product-market competition from the unexpected
passage of the Canada-United States FTA in 1989.
3.1. Institutional Background
I take advantage of the unexpected passage of the Canada-United States FTA in my identication strat-
egy. The trade agreement led to a short period of CEO-rm mismatch allowing me to identify the main
questions in this paper.
The Canada-United States FTA in 1989 is the second trade agreement between the United States and
another country.3 In 1985, the idea for a bilateral free-trade agreement was advanced by the Canadian
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and embraced by the US President Ronald Reagan. Negotiations for the
3The rst FTA was the Israel-United States Free Trade Agreement in 1985
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agreement were started in May 1986 and concluded in October 1987. Both countries agreed to phase
out most of the tari barriers over a ten-year period. The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
substantially increased trade between the two nations (Clausing, 2001; Romalis, 2007). To illustrate the
impacts of the agreement on the Canada-US trade, Figure 2 presents the growth of U.S. imports from
Canada, grouped based on dierent tari levels, and the growth of similar products imported from
the other countries. For U.S. imports from Canada, there is a strong positive relationship between the
pre-FTA tari levels and the increase in imports following the passage of the FTA. However, for U.S.
imports from the other countries, there is no signicant dierence in the growth of U.S. imports in each
group of products. Moreover, for the group of tari-free products, there is no signicant dierence in
the growth of U.S. imports from Canada and of those from other countries. The gure evidences that
the passage of the agreement positively aected the growth U.S. imports from Canada, particularly for
the products in high tari brackets.
[Figure 2 about here]
In Canada, the negotiated agreement, however, was highly controversial and was not expected to be
approved. Two opposition parties, the Liberal Party of Canada and the New Democratic Party, strongly
opposed the FTA and used their majority in the Senate to block the trade agreement. The agreement
became the most important issue for the election in October 1988. Although a majority of the voters
had voted for the two opposition parties, The Progressive Conservative Party of the prime minister
won a governing majority allowing the Canadian Senate to pass the agreement into law. The FTA
came into eect on January 1st, 1989. The high contest over the Canada-United States FTA and the
unexpected outcome are the key features making the agreement a likely exogenous shock to product-
market competition in the two countries.
The United States and Canada are the world’s largest bilateral trade partners.4 Given the size of the
two economies and the high elasticity of substitution (Head and Ries, 2001), the impacts of the FTA on
4https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c1220.html
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the US economy and Canada’s economy were signicant. Romalis (2007) shows that for commodities
that experienced deepest US tari cuts, Canada’s share of US imports almost doubled in 5 years after
the agreement. Treer (2004) nds that the trade agreement signicantly increased the productivity
of Canadian rms. Industries, most protected by Canadian taris before the agreement, reduced em-
ployment by 12 percent and raised labor productivity by 15 percent after the taris were phased out.
In industries, facing the highest level of US taris before the FTA, labor productivity increased 14 per-
cent after the FTA. Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) nd that American rms change their organizational
structure in response to the growing competition from Canadian products.
The unexpected passage and signicant impacts of this trade agreement make it an arguably quasi-
natural experiment for my study.
3.2. Sample Construction
Segment Data - The sample for my main hypothesis tests starts with all segment-years reported
in Compustat’s Historical Segments during the period from 1984 to 1994. Since 1976, the Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 14 (FAS 14) of the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) has
required rms to report information about segments of which sales, assets, or prots account for over 10
percent of consolidated totals. While 10 percent is the threshold for reporting requirement, rms often
continue disclosing information when sales or prot of a business segment falls below 10 percent of the
totals. Following previous studies, I include those rm-segments in my sample. Compustat’s Historical
Segments identies rms using Global Company Key (GVKEY) and one unique identication number
(SID) for a segment of the company. GVKEY is the identication that I use to match segment data with
other datasets for rm-level variables. Combining GVKEY and SID, I can track dierent segments within
a rm over my sample period. Since I am only interested in business segments, I exclude other types of
reported segments such as geographical segments, operating segments, and state segments. Following
Hoechle et al. (2012) and others, I exclude rms in the nancial industries (SIC code 6000-6999) and
American Depository Receipts (ADR) from my sample. I impose two additional lters to ensure that
the sample is appropriate for my empirical strategy and to reduce the hand-collecting requirement
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to construct the measure of industry-transferable skill. First, each segment must be reported in, at
least, two years before 1989 and two years after 1989. I exclude all segments which do not meet this
requirement. Second, for a rm-year to be included in the sample, it must have at least two reported
segments. After applying these lters, I match the data with the CEO data constructed in the next step.
Treatment Eect - The eects of the FTA on each business segment are measured by the pre-1989
tari level applicable to Canadian imports in that segment. Because the tari phase-out process for each
sector varies from zero to ten years, the choice of the phase-out time may be endogenously aected by
factors such as lobbying, negotiations, and the relative importance of each sector in the US economy. To
address this concern, I follow Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) in constructing variable Taris_89 which is the
three-year average tari rate on Canadian imports by the segment’s SIC four-digit code in the pre-FTA
period from 1986 to 1988. I calculate the US taris on Canadian imports by dividing duty by customs
value. The yearly values of duty and customs are available on the website of the Center for International
Data at the University of California at Davis. Taris_89 is matched with rm and segment data using SIC
codes. This measure quanties treatment eects of the FTA on US companies and segments. Within
my sample, the variable ranges from zero to 21 percent. For convenient interpretation of results, I
standardize this variable to have mean zero and standard deviation one. I create dummy variable Post
indicating 1989 and following years in the sample period.
Industry-Transferable Skills - As in the previous part, the measure of CEOs’ industry-transferable
skills is Multi-Industry Experience, the number of industries at the SIC three-digit level in which an ex-
ecutive has experienced before taking a CEO position, to be the measure of industry-transferable skills.
This variable is also standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. A condition for CEOs
to be reported in BoardEx is that the executives must hold positions in notable rms in 1999. Therefore,
analyses using BoardEx for pre-1999 periods are potentially subjected to this survivorship bias (Custó-
dio et al., 2013). My identication strategy based on three dierences could partly mitigate this concern.
Specically, the survivorship bias could aect my estimation only if the probability of being included
in BoardEx is correlated with all three dierences: the passage of the FTA, CEOs’ industry-transferable
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skills, and the pre-1989 tari levels. Moreover, to address this concern directly, I hand-collect a sample
of 262 CEOs of my sample rms who cannot be identied in BoardEx.5 I rst estimate all regression
models on the sample of 696 CEOs from BoardEx, then, re-estimate the models on a combined sample
of hand-collected CEOs and CEOs from BoardEx. If the dierence between the estimation from the two
sample is negligible, the eect of this survivorship bias is likely to be insignicant.
I use other CEO characteristics such as age, gender, tenure, and education background as con-
trol variables. After merging this CEO data with the segment data, I end up with a sample of 15,483
CEO-segment-year observations. The statistics of the main dependent and independent variables are
presented in Panel B of Table 1.
3.3. Empirical Strategy and Results
To determine whether there is a causal relation between market competition and the demand for
CEOs’ industry-transferable skills, I rst investigate the change in the CEO market following the pas-
sage of the FTA. If increased competition from international trade liberalization contributes to the
value increase of industry-transferable skills in the market for CEOs, executives with greater Multi-
Industry Experience will be more preferred than executives with lesser Multi-Industry Experience fol-
lowing this trade agreement. Firms should try to retain incumbent CEOs who have greater industry-
transferable skills. To test this in a dierences-in-dierences framework, I subdivide my CEO sample
into high industry-transferable skills and low industry-transferable skills, based on whether a CEO’s
Multi-Industry Experience is greater than the median value of 2. I then estimate the following speci-
cation on each sample:
CEOTurnoverj,t = α+β1Postt×Weighted Tariffs_89j+CEOControlsj,t+FirmFEj+YearFEt+j,t
(2)
where CEO Turnoverj,t indicates whether the CEO is replaced by the end of the year; Postt indicates
1989 and subsequent years; Weighted Taris_89j is the segment-revenue-weighted tari rate of the rm
5 The information about the biography of these CEOs come from the combination of SEC lings, International Directory
of Company Histories, Marquis Who’s Who, and article search.
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from 1986 to 1988; CEO Controlsj,t is a vector of control variables for CEO characteristics; FirmFEj are
rm xed eects; and YearFEj are year xed eects.
[Table 7 about here]
Table 7 presents the results of this set of tests. Columns (1) and (3) report the estimated coecients
for the sample of executives who could be identied in BoardEx database. In Column (1), the test on the
subsample of chief executives who have worked in two or fewer industries indicates that the passage
of the FTA increases the turnover propensity. The coecient on the interaction term is positive and
signicant at the 10 percent level. After the passage of the FTA, one standard deviation higher in the
tari rates is correlated with 1.7 percentage point increase in the turnover propensity. Likewise, for
the subsample of CEOs who have worked in more than two industries, the passage of the FTA has
insignicant eects on the turnover propensity. I obtain similar results for the test on the combined
sample of BoardEx data and hand-collected data. In Column (2), the coecient on the interaction of
Post dummy andWeighted Tariffs_89 is positive and signicant at the 5 percent level. CEOs in rms
which were protected from Canadian imports before 1989 face a higher chance of turnovers following
the passage of the FTA. After the passage of the FTA, one standard deviation higher in the tari rates
is correlated with 2.0 percentage point increase in the CEO turnover rate. For the group of CEOs with
experience in more than two industries, Column (4), the passage of the Canada-United State FTA does
not have a signicant impact on the propensity of CEO turnovers. These results indicate that when
product markets become more competitive, rms are more likely to retain the chief executives who
possess greater industry-transferable skills than ones who have lesser industry-transferable skills.
So far, I have shown that companies are less likely to replace CEOs with industry-transferable skills
when product-market competition increases. To further test the impacts of product-market competi-
tion on the CEO market, I check whether rms choose executives with greater industry-transferable
skills for the CEO position when competition increases. I estimate a dierences-in-dierences model
in which Multi-Industry Experiencej,t is regressed on the interaction term of Weighted Taris_89j and
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Postt, rm xed eects, and year xed eects. As in rm xed-eects models, I use a sample of CEO
positions rather than the full panel data. Table 8 reports the results of dierent regression specications
for this test. In all specications, the coecient on the interaction term is positive and statistically sig-
nicant at the 5 percent level. A positive coecient of the interaction term indicates that rms choose
executives with greater industry-transferable skills for the CEO position after the FTA removed the tar-
i protection. Specically, after the passage of the FTA, a rm with one standard deviation higher in the
pre-FTA tari level selects a new CEO who has 0.16 to 0.19 standard deviation higher in Multi-Industry
Experience.
[Table 8 about here]
The purpose of the next set of tests is to examine whether CEOs who have industry-transferable
skills are preferred because they can deliver higher performance in competitive environment. A major
challenge in making a causal inference about the relationship between CEO characteristics and rms’
performance is the endogeneity of CEO-rm matching. The early seminal work of Bertrand and Schoar
(2003) recognized this important empirical problem. The rm xed eects or dierences-in-dierences
approach using rm-level data only address endogenous matching based on time-invariant rm char-
acteristics. To address this empirical challenge, I rely on the with-in rm variation of segment data and
the exogenous shock to product-market competition from the passage of the Canadian-United State
FTA. The intuition for these segment-level tests is that in a conglomerate with two business segments,
the CEO is selected as the ultimate decision makers for both segments. Since each segment within the
rm has a dierent level of exposure to the FTA, the CEO’s performance in the more aected segment
could be compared to his/her owner performance in the less aected segment. The segment data also
allow me to include rm-year xed eects which absorb almost all CEO and rm unobservables. Be-
cause both segments are in one rm-year and managed by the same CEO, the endogenous CEO-rm
matching does not aect my estimation. My identifying assumption is that without the Canada-United
States FTA, the growth, before and after 1989, in the performance of all segments are insignicantly
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dierent.
I rst use dierences-in-dierences models to test the impacts of CEOs’ industry-transferable skills
on segments’ performance after the passage of the FTA. As in the earlier tests, I split my sample into
one for CEOs with Multi-Industry Experience of 2 and under and the other for CEOs with Multi-Industry
Experience of over 2. On each subsample, I then test the following regression model:
(3)
Segment Outcomesi,j,t = α+ β1Postt × Tariffs_89i,j + β2Tariffs_89i,j
+ Firm-YearFEj,t + i,j,t
where i,j and t denote segment i, rm j, and year t. Segment Outcomesi,j,t are the segment-level out-
comes of interest; Postt is a dummy which is equal to 1 for 1989 and subsequent years and zero, other-
wise; Taris_89i,j is the average tari rate of the segment i in rm j from 1986 to 1988; Firm-Year FEj,t
is a series of xed eects for each pair of rm-year. The coecient of interest β1 estimates the impacts
of the trade agreement on a more aected segment relative to the impacts on a less aected segment
in the same rm-year.
Two available measures for segment performance are the logarithm of segment revenue, variable
SALES in Compustat’s Historical Segments data, and segment return on assets (ROA), measured as the
ratio of OPS to IAS. Table 9 reports the results of these tests. For the subsample of CEOs with Multi-
Industry Experience of 2 and under, the coecient on Postt×Tariffs_89i,j is negative and statistically
signicant for the segment ROA models. Specically, one standard deviation higher in tari protection
against Canadian imports is associated with a 1.6 to 2.5 percentage point drop in segment ROA after the
taris are phased out. On the other side, the passage of the FTA seems to have no signicant impact on
the ROA and revenue of segments managed by CEOs with Multi-Industry Experience of over 2. These
results indicate that CEOs with greater industry-transferable skills are more successful in maintaining
segment protability than those with lesser industry-transferable skills when competition increases.
[Table 9 about here]
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I then use a dierences-in-dierences-in-dierence method to formally test the results in Table 9.
The regression equation is as follows:
Segment Outcomesi,j,t = α+ β1Multi− Industry Experiencej,t × Postt × Tariffs_89i,j
+ β2Multi− IndustryExperiencej,t × Tariffs_89i,j
+ β3Postt × Tariffs_89i,j + β4Tariffs_89i,j + Firm-Year FEj,t + i,j,t
(4)
The coecient of interest is on the interaction of Multi-Industry Experiencej,t, Postt and
Tariffs_89i,j. The estimated coecients are reported in Table 10. In both segment revenue models
and segment ROA models, the estimated coecient on the interaction term is positive and statistically
signicant. A positive coecient indicates that CEOs who have greater industry-transferable skills are
more successful in growing revenue and operating prots in segments which were more aected by
the FTA passage. One standard deviation higher in Multi-Industry Experience and Taris_89 leads to
a 4.2 percent to 5.6 percent increase in segment revenue and a 0.9 to 2.3 percentage point increase in
segment ROA.
[Table 10 about here]
The results are robust to the inclusion of rm xed eects and control variables, Columns (1), (3),
(5) and (7). When rm-year xed eects are included, Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8), the interaction
coecient becomes larger and more signicant. My results from the BoardEx sample and the combined
sample indicate that the possible survivorship bias does not seem to aect my estimation. The estimated
coecient on the interaction term has similar magnitude and signicance in both samples.
An important assumption in my triple dierence analysis is that the performances of a more af-
fected segment and a less aected segment followed parallel trends prior to the adoption of the FTA.
To validate this assumption, I rst use graphs to check whether there are pre-trends in segment per-
formance prior to the passage of the FTA. I replace the Postt in the equation (4) with dummy variables,
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Year Dummyt, indicating each year during the sample. Then, I estimate the models for segment rev-
enue and segment ROA and plot the coecients on the interaction term of Multi-Industry Experiencej,t,
Taris_89i,j, and Year Dummyt for each year in the sample period. If the parallel condition is satised,
the graphs will show a clear jump around the passage of the FTA. Figure 3 plots the estimated coe-
cients and their 95 percent intervals. Both segment revenue and ROA graphs show a clear jump around
the event year. The gures indicate that my results are not explained by possible pre-trends in segment
performance.
[Figure 3 about here]
Second, I directly test the parallel trend condition by including in my models a dummy variable,
False Postt, which equals to one in the period 1987-1992, and zero in other years. In the each model,
I estimate the coecient on Postt × Multi-Industry Experiencej,t × Taris_89i,j, and the coecient
on False Postt × Multi-Industry Experiencej,t × Taris_89i,j. If the condition is satised, the former
coecient should be similar to that in Table 10; the later coecient should be insignicantly dierent
from zero. As shown in Table A3, the coecients of False Postt and its interaction terms are statistically
insignicant in both models, the coecients of interest are signicant and mostly unchanged. This test
suggests that pre-existing trends are not a concern in my empirical strategy.
4 Deregulation
Besides international trade agreements, dierent waves of deregulation in major industries have
changed the competition environment in the US over the last several decades. I use these policy changes
to conrm that increased competition induces higher demand for industry-transferable skills in the
CEO market. There were two major deregulations in the 1990s: the National Energy Policy Act of 1992
that opened the energy distribution market and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that opened the
telecommunications industry.
4.1. Institutional Background
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The National Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) directly change the competition environment of
the electric utility industry. This act aected the competition in the electricity distribution sector in
two ways. First, EPACT directed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to order electric
utilities to transmit electricity generated by other suppliers to the US power transmission grid at just
and reasonable rates. This change opened the distribution market, which used to be accessible exclu-
sively to transmission-owning electric utilities, for all electricity suppliers. Second, the Act removed
corporate ownership and geographical regulations imposed by the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935 (PUHCA) that restrained the use of certain electric power generators. This change enabled non-
utility wholesale power generators to compete without being constrained by regulations designed for
utility companies. This Act created a new category of independent power generators, called "exempt
wholesale generators." As a result, EPACT has considerably increased the level of competition in the
electric utility industry.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was the most signicant change in the telecommunications
law since the Communications Act of 1934. Although telecommunications had traditionally been con-
sidered a natural monopoly and regulated sector, the sector has evolved signicantly following tech-
nological breakthroughs in transmission and the breakup of AT&T. In passing the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Congress aimed to clear the way for necessary changes with the main goal to "let any-
one enter any communications business -to let any communications business compete in any market
against any other."6 The Act prevented companies from becoming monopolies and eliminated old reg-
ulations that had kept businesses in the industry from competing.
4.2. Sample Construction
To test for the impact of deregulation in the electricity sector, I use the sample of Compustat non-
nancial rms from 1988, four years before deregulation, to 1995, four years after deregulation. As
in Section 2, my measure of CEOs’ industry-transferable skills, variable Multi-Industry Experience, is
constructed as the number of industries at the SIC three-digit level of CRSP rms where a manager had
6https://transition.fcc.gov/telecom.html
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worked before taking a CEO position. Variable Post Deregulation indicates 1992 and the subsequent
years in the sample period. Deregulated is a dummy variable which equals to one for electricity rms
(SIC codes: 4910, 4911, 4931) and zero for rms with other SIC codes. In 1992, there were 17 companies
in the deregulated sector which have data for all variables.
In the tests for the telecommunications deregulation, the sample is Compustat non-nancial rms
from 1992 to 1999. Since this sample overlaps with the sample for the telecom deregulation, all electric-
ity rms (SIC codes: 4910, 4911, 4931) are excluded. Variable Multi-Industry Experience is constructed
using the similar method in Section 2. In these tests, variable Post Deregulation indicates 1996 and
the subsequent years in the sample period. Deregulated is a dummy variable which equals to one for
telecommunications rms (SIC codes: 4800 to 4899) and zero, otherwise. In 1996, there were 39 telecom-
munications companies which have data for all variables.
I collect control variables for CEO characteristics from BoardEx. Accounting variables are obtained
from Compustat and winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent levels. The statistics of the main dependent
and independent variables are presented in Panel C of Table 1.
4.3. Empirical Analysis and Results
As in the previous sections, I examine the impact of deregulation on the increased importance
of industry-transferable skills in the CEO market. I then test whether CEOs with greater industry-
transferable skills outperform in deregulated industries after the passage of the deregulation. To verify
the impact on CEO retaining decision, I estimate the following regression model:
(5)
Yj,t =α+ β1Multi− Industry Experiencej,t × Post Deregulationt ×Deregulatedj
+ β2Multi− Industry Experiencej,t × Post Deregulationt
+ β3Post Deregulationt ×Deregulatedj
+ β4Multi− Industry Experiencej,t ×Deregulatedj
+ β5Multi− Industry Experiencej,t + β6CEO&FirmControlsj,t
+ FirmFEj + YearFEt + j,t
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where Yj,t is a dummy variable indicating whether the incumbent CEO of rm j is replaced at the
end of year t; Multi-Industry Experiencej,t is the measure of CEOs’ industry-transferable skills; Post
Deregulationt equals to one for the year in which the deregulation came into eect and subsequent
years; Deregulatedj indicates rms in the deregulated industries; CEO& Firm Controlsj,t is a vector
of CEO and rm control variables; FirmFEj are rm xed eects; YearFEt are year xed eects. The
coecient on the interaction term of Multi-Industry Experiencej,t, Post Deregulationt, and Deregulatedj
estimates the marginal impact of industry-transferable skills on rms’ propensity to retain the CEOs.
Table 11 reports the results of these tests. In Columns (1) and (2), the triple dierence coe-
cient shows that for an electricity rm after the deregulation, one standard deviation higher in CEOs’
industry-transferable skills reduce the propensity of CEO turnovers by 2.3 percentage points. The co-
ecient is signicant at 1 percent level. CEOs’ industry-transferable skills also reduce the propensity
of CEO turnovers when the telecommunications sector was deregulated. In Columns (3) and (4), the
coecient on the interaction of Multi-Industry Experiencej,t, Post Deregulationt, and Deregulatedj is
economically large and statistically signicant at the 5 percent level. For a CEO of a telecommunica-
tion company, one standard deviation higher in industry-transferable skills reduces the propensity of
CEO turnovers by 4.1 percentage points. These results are consistent with those in Section 2.
[Table 11 about here]
Because of the size of the treatment groups in both deregulation shocks, I could not estimate the
models for CEO selection decision as in the previous two settings. Therefore, I continue my analy-
sis by examining whether CEOs who have greater industry-transferable skills would perform better
in deregulated industries. To test this hypothesis, I use regression equation (5) with dependent vari-
ables, the logarithm of rm revenue and rm ROA. The coecient of interest is on the interaction of
Multi-Industry Experiencej,t, Post Deregulationt, and Deregulatedj. Table 12 presents the results of this
test. Regarding the electricity deregulation, Columns (1) and (2), the coecient on the interaction is
insignicant in both models. For the telecommunications deregulation, Columns (3) and (4), the coef-
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cient is positive and signicant at 1 percent level in both models. One standard deviation higher in
CEOs’ industry-transferable skills leads to 3.3 percent growth in rm revenue and 2.5 percentage points
higher in ROA.
[Table 12 about here]
The results in this section support my proposed hypotheses in this paper. Increased competition,
resulted from deregulation, leads to higher demand for CEOs with greater industry-transferable skills.
In deregulated industries, CEOs with greater industry-transferable skills outperform CEOs with lesser
industry-transferable skills.
5 Conclusion
As Bertrand (2009) discusses, CEOs are "the key decision-makers in corporations that account for
most of the economic activity in modern economies." Over the past several decades, the CEO market
has evolved signicantly and presents major questions for studies in the CEO literature. This paper
addresses one of those questions: Why would the importance of transferable managerial skills have
increased so much over the last 30-40 years? (Bertrand, 2009)
Studying the CEO market in three dierent empirical settings, I identify increased competition in
the product markets as a driving force behind the rising importance of transferable managerial skills,
specically industry-transferable skills. When competition increases, rms tend to retain incumbent
chief executives with greater industry-transferable skills and to select new ones who have these skills.
CEOs with greater industry-transferable skills are preferred in a competitive market since these ex-
ecutives have positive impacts on revenue growth and protability. My analysis identies corporate
innovation as one channel of eects. CEOs with greater industry-transferable skills are more likely to
undertake risker but more innovative projects when the rms face with increased competition pressure.
As companies need these projects to dierentiate from new market entrants, this explains the rising
demand for CEOs who possess these skills.
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This study highlights the role of product-market competition in the rising importance of chief ex-
ecutives’ industry-transferable skills. Other transferable skills such as leadership, business education,
restructuring abilities, organizational skills, have also become more and more valuable in the labor
market for top executives. Firms’ increased dependence on external nancing, rising role of public
relation, and waves of mergers and acquisitions may be among the economic forces that drive the de-
mand for those managerial qualities. Future research could shed light on how those processes impact
the executive market.
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Figure 3: Parallel Trend Analysis
This gure presents the point estimate and the 95% condence interval of interaction coecients of
Multi− IndustryExperiencej,t × Year Dummyt × Tariffs_89i,j estimated in this model
Segment Outcomesi,j,t = α+ β1Multi-Industry Experiencej,t × Year Dummyt× Tariffs_89i,j
+ β2YearDummyt × Tariffs_89i,j + β3Multi-Industry Experiencej,t × Tariffs_89i,j
+ β4Tariffs_89i,j + Firm-YearFEj,t + i,j,t
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Firm Fixed-Eects Models
Mean p10 p50 p90 S.D. N
Multi-Industry Experience 2.34 1.00 2.00 4.00 1.34 32,840
HHI 0.16 0.05 0.12 0.32 0.15 32,840
TNIC3 HHI 0.24 0.06 0.16 0.55 0.22 32,840
CEO Turnover 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 32,840
Revenue ($mil) 2,343.95 20.55 338.01 5,121.65 6,787.70 32,840
Prot ($mil) 247.02 -16.41 22.47 517.20 834.04 32,840
ROA 0.02 -0.18 0.07 0.18 0.24 32,840
Tobin’s Q 2.13 0.91 1.52 3.75 2.64 32,840
R&D/Sale 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.27 1.68 32,840
Patent 19.90 0.00 0.00 25.44 119.02 11,253
Citation 164.14 0.00 0.00 148.61 1,487.17 11,253
Panel B: The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
Mean p10 p50 p90 S.D. N
Multi-Industry Experience 2.36 1.00 2.00 4.00 1.50 5,859
CEO Turnover 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 5,859
Weighted Tari_89 1.03 0.00 0.00 3.75 2.14 5,859
Taris_89 1.83 0.00 0.29 4.79 2.84 15,483
Segment Revenue ($mil) 1,057.20 7.70 194.08 2,364.53 4,109.59 15,483
Segment ROA 0.12 -0.04 0.11 0.30 0.16 15,483
Segment CaPex/Total Capex 0.39 0.02 0.25 0.93 0.67 15,483
Panel C: Deregulations
Mean p10 p50 p90 S.D. N
Electricity
Multi-Industry Experience 1.92 1.00 2.00 3.00 1.24 9,011
CEO Turnover 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 9,011
Revenue ($mil) 1,455.74 9.99 191.80 4,034.04 3,301.26 9,011
ROA 0.02 -0.07 0.04 0.13 0.26 9,011
Telecommunications
Multi-Industry Experience 2.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 1.22 15,881
CEO Turnover 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 15,881
Revenue ($mil) 1,342.51 10.25 168.15 3,304.45 3,288.77 15,881
ROA 0.00 -0.14 0.04 0.13 0.21 15,881
Details about variable construction as in Appendix A1
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Table 2: Product Market Competition, CEOs’ Industry Transferable Skills, and CEO
Turnovers
This table reports the results of rm xed-eects models examining the impact of product-market com-
petition and CEOs’ industry-transferable skills on the propensity of CEO turnovers. The dependent
variable is CEO Turnover which equals to 1 if the CEO is replaced at the end of the nancial year in
the sample period from 1999 to 2012. Multi-Industry Experience is the number of industries at the SIC
three-digit level in which an executive had experienced before becoming CEO. Competition is dened
as one minus the Herndahl-Hirschman Index. The index ranges from zero to one and is constructed
using Compustat sale at the SIC three-digit code level, Columns (1) and (2), or the Text Based Industry
Classications, Columns (3) and (4), suggested by Hoberg and Phillips (2010). Variables Multi-Industry
Experience and Competition are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Standard
errors are clustered at the SIC three-digit level and shown in the paratheses. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
CEO Turnoveri,j,t =α+ β1Competitionj,t ×Multi-Industry Experiencei,t + β2Competitionj,t
+ β3Multi-Industry Experiencei + β4CEO Controlsi,t + FirmFEj + YearFEt + i,j,t
Compustat HHI TNIC3 HHI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Competition ×Multi-Industry -0.005∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗
Experience (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Competition 0.006 0.011∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Multi-Industry Experience -0.024∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.023∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
CEO Age 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Male CEO 0.013 0.013
(0.023) (0.022)
CEO Tenure 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Externally Hired CEO -0.026∗∗ -0.027∗∗
(0.011) (0.011)
CEO is the chairperson 0.004 0.008
(0.008) (0.009)
CEO has an MBA degree -0.073∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012)
CEO has an Ivy League degree -0.033∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
Firm Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firm Years 37,418 37,288 33,931 33,868
Adj. R-Square 0.009 0.066 0.009 0.068
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Table 4: Product Market Competition, CEOs’ Industry Transferable Skills and Firm Perfor-
mance
This table presents the results of rm xed-eects models examining the impacts of product-market
competition on rm performance. The dependent variables in these models are the logarithm of rev-
enue, the logarithm of prot, ROA and Tobin’s Q in the 1999-2012 period. Multi-Industry Experience is
is the number of industries at the SIC three-digit level in which an executive had experienced before be-
coming CEO. Competition is dened as one minus the Herndahl-Hirschman Index. The index ranges
from zero to one and is constructed using Compustat sale at the SIC three-digit code level. Variables
Multi-Industry Experience and Competition are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation
one. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC three-digit level and shown in the paratheses. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Firm Outcomesi,j,t =α+ β1Competitionj,t ×Multi-Industry Experiencei,t + β2Competitionj,t
+ β3Multi-Industry Experiencei,t + β4CEO Controlsi,t + FirmFEj + YearFEt + i,j,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Revenue Prot ROA Tobin’s Q
Competition × 0.002 0.019 0.004∗∗ -0.022
Multi-Industry Experience (0.012) (0.012) (0.002) (0.043)
Competition 0.072∗∗ 0.067 0.008 -0.244∗
(0.034) (0.044) (0.007) (0.136)
Multi-Industry Experience 0.014 -0.016 -0.000 -0.064
(0.011) (0.014) (0.002) (0.073)
CEO Age 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.012
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.008)
Male CEO 0.116∗ 0.216∗∗ 0.013 -0.025
(0.066) (0.100) (0.009) (0.188)
CEO Tenure 0.013∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006)
Externally Hired CEO 0.021 -0.037 -0.000 -0.255∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.007) (0.079)
CEO is the chairperson -0.056∗ -0.040 -0.008 0.180
(0.031) (0.029) (0.006) (0.179)
CEO has an MBA degree -0.023 0.003 -0.003 0.190∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.030) (0.007) (0.066)
CEO has an Ivy League degree -0.003 0.025 -0.011∗∗ 0.162
(0.029) (0.044) (0.005) (0.138)
Firm Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firm Years 37,288 27,393 37,278 34,757
Adj. R-Square 0.251 0.138 0.013 0.029
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Table 5: Product Market Competition, CEOs’ Industry Transferable Skills, and Innovative
Activities
This table reports the results of rm xed-eects models examining the impacts of product-market com-
petition and CEOs’ industry-transferable skills on rms’ innovative activities. The dependent variables
in these models are the R&D to revenue, book leverage, cash holdings to total assets, and capital ex-
penditure to total assets in the 1999-2012 period. Multi-Industry Experience is the number of industries
at the SIC three-digit level in which an executive had experienced before becoming CEO. Competition
is dened as one minus the Herndahl-Hirschman Index. The index ranges from zero to one and is
constructed using Compustat sale at the SIC three-digit code level. Variables Multi-Industry Experi-
ence and Competition are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Standard errors
are clustered at the SIC three-digit level and shown in the paratheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
R&Di,j,t =α+ β1Competitionj,t ×Multi-Industry Experiencei,t + β2Competitionj,t
+ β3Multi-Industry Experiencei,t + β4CEO Controlsi,t + FirmFEj + YearFEt + i,j,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R&D Leverage Cash CaPex
Competition ×Multi-Industry Experience 0.016∗∗ 0.005 -0.001 0.000
(0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.000)
Competition 0.003 -0.010 -0.001 -0.001
(0.023) (0.013) (0.004) (0.002)
Multi-Industry Experience 0.019∗ -0.007 -0.000 0.000
(0.010) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001)
CEO Age 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Male CEO -0.165∗ 0.318 -0.012 -0.001
(0.088) (0.311) (0.009) (0.003)
CEO Tenure 0.008∗ 0.001 0.000 0.000∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Externally Hired CEO -0.065 0.046 -0.003 0.002
(0.044) (0.059) (0.002) (0.001)
CEO is the chairperson 0.014 0.003 0.002 -0.001
(0.016) (0.016) (0.004) (0.002)
CEO has an MBA degree 0.015 0.073 -0.001 0.001
(0.043) (0.058) (0.004) (0.001)
CEO has an Ivy League degree 0.045∗∗ -0.012 -0.005 -0.003∗∗
(0.022) (0.013) (0.003) (0.001)
Firm Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firm Years 36,290 36,290 36,290 36,290
Adj. R-Square 0.376 0.001 0.063 0.048
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Table 6: CEOs’ Industry Transferable Skills, Product Market Competition and Corporate In-
novation
This table reports the results of rm xed-eects models examining the impacts of product-market com-
petition and CEOs’ industry-transferable skills on rms’ innovation outputs. The dependent variables
in these models are the logarithm of the number of patents, Columns (1) and (2), and the logarithm of
the number of citations in the 1999-2006 period. Multi-Industry Experience is the number of industries
at the SIC three-digit level in which an executive had experienced before becoming CEO. Competition
is dened as one minus the Herndahl-Hirschman Index. The index ranges from zero to one and is
constructed using Compustat sale at the SIC three-digit code level. Variables Multi-Industry Experi-
ence and Competition are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Standard errors
are clustered at the SIC three-digit level and shown in the paratheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Innovationi,j,t =α+ β1Competitionj,t ×Multi-Industry Experiencei,t + β2Competitionj,t
+ β3Multi-Industry Experiencei,t + β4CEO Controlsi,t + FirmFEj + YearFEt + i,j,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Patent+1) Log(Patent+1) Log(Citation+1) Log(Citation+1)
Competition × 0.033∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.063∗ 0.061∗
Multi-Industry Experience (0.017) (0.017) (0.035) (0.035)
Competition -0.009 -0.008 -0.117 -0.111
(0.048) (0.047) (0.123) (0.123)
Multi-Industry Experience -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.004
(0.022) (0.025) (0.035) (0.041)
CEO Age 0.003 0.015∗∗
(0.003) (0.006)
Male CEO 0.224∗ 0.228
(0.131) (0.354)
CEO Tenure 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.010)
Externally Hired CEO -0.010 -0.041
(0.039) (0.086)
CEO is the chairperson -0.066∗ -0.108
(0.034) (0.086)
CEO has an MBA degree -0.025 -0.091
(0.035) (0.089)
CEO has an Ivy League degree -0.033 -0.125
(0.046) (0.109)
Firm Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firm-Years 11,253 11,239 11,253 11,239
Adj. R-Square 0.283 0.283 0.388 0.390
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Table 7: The Canada-United States FTA, Industry Transferable Skills, and CEO Turnover
This table presents the results of dierences-in-dierences regression examining the impact of the pas-
sage of the FTA on the propensity of CEO turnovers. The dependent variable is an indicator which
equals to 1 if the CEO is replaced by the end of the year. The sample is Compustat rm-years from
1984 to 1994. Multi-Industry Experience is the number of SIC three-digit codes that the executive had
experienced before becoming CEO. Post is an indicator which equals to 1 for years after the US-Canada
FTA in 1989 and equals to 0 otherwise; Weighted Taris_89 is the segment-revenue-weighted tari rate
on Canadian imports from 1986 to 1988. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC three-digit level and
shown in the paratheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
CEO Turnoverj,t = α+ β1Postt ×Weighted Tariffs_89j + CEOControlsj,t + FirmFEj + YearFEt + j,t
Multi-Industry Experience 6 2 Multi-Industry Experience > 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BoardEx Combined BoardEx Combined
Post ×Weighted Tari_89 0.017∗ 0.020∗∗ -0.004 -0.006
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
CEO Age 0.011∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
CEO Tenure 0.003 0.004∗ 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
CEO First Year -0.045∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.039∗∗
(0.016) (0.012) (0.019) (0.016)
Externally Hired CEO 0.038 0.050 0.008 0.001
(0.040) (0.037) (0.035) (0.034)
CEO is the chairperson -0.176∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.051) (0.048)
CEO has an MBA degree -0.073 -0.085 -0.072 -0.074
(0.069) (0.059) (0.131) (0.132)
CEO has an Ivy League degree 0.018 0.014 0.095 0.089
(0.064) (0.065) (0.078) (0.078)
Male CEO - - 0.082 0.116
- - (0.198) (0.171)
Firm Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Segment-Years 2,598 3,805 1,698 2,058
Adj. R-Square 0.053 0.053 0.054 0.055
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Table 8: Demand for CEOs’ Industry Transferable Skills
This table presents the results of dierences-in-dierences regression models examining the impact
of the passage of the FTA on the level of industry-transferable skills of incoming CEOs. The depen-
dent variables are Multi-Industry Experience, measured as the number of SIC three-digit code that the
manager had experienced before becoming CEO. Post is an indicator which equals to 1 for years after
the US-Canada FTA in 1989 and equals to 0 otherwise; Weighted Taris_89 is the segment-revenue-
weighted tari rate on Canadian imports from 1986 to 1988. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC
three-digit level and shown in the paratheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Multi-Industry Experiencej,t = α+ β1Postt ×Weighted Tariffs_89j + FirmFEj + YearFEt + j,t
BoardEx Sample Combined Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post ×Weighted Tari_89 0.188∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.083) (0.063) (0.064)
CEO Age 0.019 0.018
(0.016) (0.012)
Male CEO 0.778 0.802
(0.635) (0.523)
CEO Tenure -0.020 -0.024∗
(0.020) (0.014)
Externally Hired CEO 0.524∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.176)
CEO is the chairperson -0.077 -0.042
(0.276) (0.214)
CEO has an MBA degree 0.184 0.147
(0.331) (0.326)
CEO has an Ivy League degree 0.371 0.357
(0.289) (0.261)
Firm Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of CEOs 696 684 959 918
Adj. R-Square 0.156 0.272 0.137 0.231
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Table 9: Segment Performance and CEOs’ Industry Transferable Skills
This table reports the results of dierences-in-dierences regression models examining the impact of
the passage of the FTA on the performance of business segments. The dependent variables are segment
revenue and segment ROA. The sample is from 1984 to 1994. Multi-Industry Experience is number of
SIC three-digit code that the manager had experienced before becoming CEO. Taris_89 is the average
tari rate of the segment from 1986 to 1988. Post is a dummy variable which is equals to 1 for years from
1989 to 1994. Standard errors are clustered at the segment SIC-code level and shown in the paratheses.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Segment Outcomesi,j,t = α+ β1Postt × Tariffs_89i,j + β2Tariffs_89i,j + Firm-YearFEj,t + i,j,t
Panel A: BoardEx Sample
Multi-Industry Experience 6 2 Multi-Industry Experience > 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Segment
Revenue
Segment
ROA
Segment
Revenue
Segment
ROA
Post × Taris_89 -0.045 -0.025∗∗∗ 0.103 0.023
(0.062) (0.008) (0.074) (0.014)
Taris_89 0.005 0.024∗∗ 0.078 -0.003
(0.060) (0.010) (0.059) (0.012)
Firm Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Segment-Years 5,298 4,904 4,219 4,070
Adj. R-Square 0.701 0.140 0.658 0.134
Panel B: Combined Sample
Multi-Industry Experience 6 2 Multi-Industry Experience > 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Segment
Revenue
Segment
ROA
Segment
Revenue
Segment
ROA
Post × Taris_89 -0.013 -0.016∗∗ 0.110∗ 0.019
(0.041) (0.008) (0.065) (0.012)
Taris_89 0.025 0.015∗∗ 0.045 -0.004
(0.043) (0.007) (0.057) (0.011)
Firm Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Segment-Years 9,911 9,516 5,328 5,175
Adj. R-Square 0.687 0.135 0.660 0.105
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Table 11: Deregulations, CEOs’ Industry Transferable Skills, and CEO Turnover
This table reports the results of dierences-in-dierences-in-dierences regression models examining the impact
of the passage of deregulatory policies and CEOs’ industry-transferable skills on the propensity of CEO turnovers.
The dependent variable is an indicator which equals to 1 if the CEO in year t is replaced by the end of the nancial
year. In Columns (1) and (2), the sample is Compustat non-nancial rms from 1988 to 1995. In Columns (3) and (4),
the sample is Compustat non-nancial and non-electricity rms from 1992 to 1999. Multi-Industry Experience is the
number of industries at the three-digit SIC level that the manager had experienced before becoming CEO. Variable
Post Deregulation indicates the deregulation year and the subsequent years in the sample period. In Columns (1)
and (2), Deregulated is a dummy variable which equals to one for electricity rms (SIC codes: 4910, 4911, 4931) and
to zero rms with other SIC codes. Deregulated is a dummy variable which equals to one for telecommunications
rms (SIC codes: 4800 to 4899) and to zero, otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC three-digit level and
shown in the paratheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
CEO Turnoverj,t =α+ β1Multi− Industry Experiencej,t × Post Deregulationt ×Deregulatedj
+ β2Multi− Industry Experiencej,t × Post Deregulationt
+ β3Post Deregulationt ×Deregulatedj
+ β4Multi− Industry Experiencej,t ×Deregulatedj
+ β5Multi− Industry Experiencej,t + β6Post Deregulationt
+ β7Deregulatedj + FirmFEj + YearFEt + j,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Electricity Electricity Telecom Telecom
Multi-Industry Experience -0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.041∗∗
× Post Deregulation × Deregulated (0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016)
Multi-Industry Experience -0.013 -0.014 -0.003 -0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Multi-Industry Experience 0.010 0.010 0.006 0.006
× Post Deregulation (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Post Deregulation × -0.022 -0.022 -0.014 -0.015
Deregulated (0.014) (0.014) (0.034) (0.034)
Multi-Industry Experience - - -0.075∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗
× Deregulated - - (0.028) (0.028)
Firm Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects No Yes No Yes
CEO-Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firm-Years 11,751 11,751 20,162 20,162
Adj. R-Square 0.053 0.054 0.061 0.061
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Table 12: Deregulation, CEOs’ Industry Transferable Skills, and Firm Performance
This table presents the results of dierences-in-dierences-in-dierences regression models examin-
ing the impact of the passage of deregulatory policies and CEOs’ industry-transferable skills on rm
performance. The dependent variables are logarithm of revenue and logarithm of operating prot. In
Columns (1) and (2), the sample is Compustat non-nancial rms from 1988 to 1995. In Columns (3) and
(4), the sample is Compustat non-nancial and non-electricity rms from 1992 to 1999. MultiIndustry
Experience is the number of industries at the three-digit SIC level that the manager had experienced
before becoming CEO. Variable Post Deregulation indicates the deregulation year and the subsequent
years in the sample period. In Columns (1) and (2), Deregulated is a dummy variable which equals to one
for electricity rms (SIC codes: 4910, 4911, 4931) and to zero rms with other SIC codes. Deregulated is
a dummy variable which equals to one for telecommunications rms (SIC codes: 4800 to 4899) and to
zero, otherwise. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC three-digit level and shown in the paratheses.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Firm Performancej,t =α+ β1Multi− Industry Experiencej,t × Post Deregulationt ×Deregulatedj
+ β2Multi− Industry Experiencej,t × Post Deregulationt
+ β3Post Deregulationt ×Deregulatedj
+ β4Multi− Industry Experiencej,t ×Deregulatedj
+ β5Multi− Industry Experiencej,t + β6Post Deregulationt
+ β7Deregulatedj + FirmFEj + YearFEt + j,t
Electricity Telecom
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Revenue ROA Revenue ROA
Multi-Industry Experience -0.012 -0.001 0.033∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗
× Post Deregulation × Deregulated (0.013) (0.001) (0.008) (0.012)
Multi-Industry Experience -0.012 0.003 -0.008 -0.002
(0.022) (0.003) (0.013) (0.002)
Multi-Industry Experience 0.006 0.002 0.016∗ 0.003∗
× Post Deregulation (0.013) (0.001) (0.009) (0.002)
Post Deregulation × -0.018 -0.006 -0.038∗∗∗ -0.022∗
Deregulated (0.017) (0.005) (0.011) (0.013)
Multi-Industry Experience - - -0.062∗∗∗ -0.003
× Deregulated - - (0.015) (0.014)
Firm Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
CEO-Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firm-Years 9,073 9,006 15,927 16,097
Adj. R-Square 0.620 0.051 0.683 -0.228
45
Appendices
Table A1: Variable Description
Variable Denition
Taris_89 The three-year average tari rate on Canadian imports by the
segment’s four-digit SIC code in the pre-FTA period from 1986 to 1988
Weighted Taris_89 The segment-revenue-weighted tari rate on
Canadian imports from 1986 to 1988
Segment Revenue The logarithm of variable SALES in
Compustat’s Historical Segments
Segment ROA The ratio of variable OPS to variable IAS in
Compustat’s Historical Segments
Multi-Industry Experience The number of industries at the SIC three-digit level in which an
executive has gained experience before taking a CEO position
CEO Turnover A dummy variable indicating whether the incumbent CEO of
a rm is replaced by the end of the year
CEO Age CEO’s age measured by the dierence between
the sample year and CEOs’ birth year
Male CEO A dummy variable indicating male CEOs
CEO Tenure The number of years in which a CEO has been in the position
CEO First Year A dummy variable indicating whether a CEO in their rst year
at the position
Externally Hired CEO A dummy variable indicating whether a CEO is selected from
outside the rms
Inside-Industry A dummy variable indicating whether a CEO is selected from
another rm in the same SIC three-digit industry
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Table A2: Variable Description (cont’d.)
Variable Denition
CEO is the chairperson A dummy variable indicating whether a CEO is also
the chairperson
CEO has an MBA degree A dummy variable indicating whether a CEO has an MBA degree
CEO has an Ivy League degree A dummy variable indicating whether
a CEO has a degree from an Ivy League school
Firm Age The dierence between the sample year and the rst year in which
the rm is reported in Compustat
Total Assets Compustat variable AT
Patent The adjusted number of patents
Citation The adjusted number of citations
Originality One minus the Herndahl index of the citations made by a patent
(Trajtenberg et al., 1997). A patent is considered more original if
it cites patents in a wider range of technology classes.
Generality One minus the Herndahl index of patents that cite the patent
of interest (Trajtenberg et al., 1997). A patent is considered more
general if it is cited by patents in a wider range of technology classes.
Competition The measure for competition which equals to one minus the HHI
Post Deregulation A dummy variable indicating the year in which the deregulation
came into eect and subsequent years
Deregulated A dummy variable indicating rms in the deregulated industries
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Table A3: Falsication Test
The table reports results of the falsication tests for the regressions in Table 10. The dependent variables
are the logarithm of revenue and the logarithm of operating prot of business segments in Compustat
Historical Segments. False Post dummy variable is equal to 1 in the period 1987-1992. Standard errors
are clustered at the segment SIC-code level and shown in the paratheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
Segment Revenue Segment ROA
Multi-Industry Experience × Post × Taris_89 0.011∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.002)
Multi-Industry Experience × False Post × Taris_89 0.004 0.003
(0.006) (0.002)
Taris_89 -0.000 0.014∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.006)
Multi-Industry Experience × Taris_89 0.007 -0.004∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.002)
Post × Taris_89 -0.023 -0.021∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.007)
False Post × Taris_89 -0.019 -0.007
(0.020) (0.007)
Firm Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects No No
CEO-Segment Controls No No
Number of Segment-Years 10,745 10,112
Adj. R-Square 0.003 0.001
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Table A4: Product Market Competition and Demand for CEOs’ Industry Transferable Skills
The dependent variable is CEOs’ Multi-Industry Experience, the number of SIC three-digit code that
the manager had experienced before becoming CEO. The sample is from 1999 to 2012. Competition
is dened as one minus the Herndahl-Hirschman Index. The index ranges from zero to one and is
constructed using Compustat sale at the SIC three-digit code level, Columns (1) and (2), or the Text
Based Industry Classications, Columns (3) and (4), suggested by Hoberg and Phillips (2010). Variables
Multi-Industry Experience and Competition are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation
one. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC three-digit level and shown in the paratheses. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Multi-Industry Experiencei,t = α+ β1Competitionj,t + β2CEO Controlsi,t + FirmFEj + YearFEt + i,j,t
Compustat HHI TNIC3 HHI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Competition 0.162∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.073) (0.037) (0.031)
CEO Age 0.027∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
Male CEO -0.260∗ -0.304∗
(0.153) (0.183)
CEO Tenure -0.060∗∗∗ -0.043
(0.017) (0.039)
Externally Hired CEO -0.083∗ -0.102
(0.050) (0.063)
CEO is the chairperson 0.154∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.087)
CEO has an MBA degree 0.109∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.060)
CEO has an Ivy League degree 0.221∗∗∗ 0.077
(0.080) (0.086)
Firm Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of CEO positions 5,465 5,418 4,325 4,296
Adj. R-Square 0.035 0.090 0.028 0.077
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Table A5: CEOs’ Industry Transferable Skills, Product Market Competition and Corporate
Innovation
This table reports estimates of ordinary least squares panel regressions examining the impact of
product-market competition and CEOs’ industry-transferable skills on the originality of rms’ patents.
The dependent variables in these models are Originality and Scaled Originality. Multi-Industry Expe-
rience is the number of industries at the SIC three-digit level in which an executive had experienced
before becoming CEO. Competition is dened as one minus the Herndahl-Hirschman Index. The in-
dex ranges from zero to one and is constructed using Compustat sale at the SIC three-digit code level.
Variables Multi-Industry Experience and Competition are standardized to have mean zero and standard
deviation one. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC three-digit level and shown in the paratheses. *,
**, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Originalityi,j,t =α+ β1Competitionj,t ×Multi-Industry Experiencei,t + β2Competitionj,t
+ β3Multi-Industry Experiencei,t + β4CEO Controlsi,t + Industry− YearFEj,t + i,j,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Originality Originality ScaledOriginality
Scaled
Originality
Multi-Industry Experience 0.004∗ 0.004∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.010∗∗
× Competition (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Multi-Industry Experience 0.004∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007 0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
CEO Age -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Male CEO -0.003 -0.005
(0.017) (0.033)
CEO Tenure 0.001∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Externally Hired CEO 0.000 -0.016
(0.010) (0.015)
CEO is the chairperson 0.004 0.005
(0.009) (0.020)
CEO has an MBA degree 0.004 0.007
(0.009) (0.015)
CEO has an Ivy League degree 0.002 0.017
(0.011) (0.024)
Industry-Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firm-Years 5,384 5,374 5,384 5,374
Adj. R-Square 0.091 0.091 0.026 0.026
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Table A6: CEOs’ Industry Transferable Skills, Product Market Competition and Corporate
Innovation
This table reports estimates of ordinary least squares panel regressions examining the impact of
product-market competition and CEOs’ industry-transferable skills on the generality of rms’ patents.
The dependent variables in these models are Generality and Scaled Generality. Multi-Industry Expe-
rience is the number of industries at the SIC three-digit level in which an executive had experienced
before becoming CEO. Competition is dened as one minus the Herndahl-Hirschman Index. The in-
dex ranges from zero to one and is constructed using Compustat sale at the SIC three-digit code level.
Variables Multi-Industry Experience and Competition are standardized to have mean zero and standard
deviation one. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC three-digit level and shown in the paratheses. *,
**, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Generalityi,j,t =α+ β1Competitionj,t ×Multi-Industry Experiencei,t + β2Competitionj,t
+ β3Multi-Industry Experiencei,t + β4CEO Controlsi,t + Industry− YearFEj,t + i,j,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Generality Generality ScaledGenerality
Scaled
Generality
Multi-Industry Experience -0.005 -0.004 -0.011 -0.011
× Competition (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011)
Multi-Industry Experience 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.014)
CEO Age -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Male CEO -0.011 0.001
(0.042) (0.082)
CEO Tenure -0.001 -0.003
(0.001) (0.003)
Externally Hired CEO 0.012 -0.001
(0.016) (0.035)
CEO is the chairperson 0.014 0.025
(0.016) (0.033)
CEO has an MBA degree 0.001 -0.003
(0.016) (0.031)
CEO has an Ivy League degree 0.026 0.055
(0.020) (0.035)
Industry-Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firm-Years 2,755 2,753 2,736 2,734
Adj. R-Square 0.052 0.052 0.002 0.001
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Table A7: CEOs’ Industry Transferable Skills, Product Market Competition and CEOs’ Com-
pensation
This table reports estimates of ordinary least squares panel regressions examining the impact of
product-market competition and CEOs’ industry-transferable skills on CEOs’ total compensation. The
dependent variables are Log_TDC1, the logarithm of EXECUCOMP TDC1, and Log_TDC1, the logarithm
of EXECUCOMP TDC2. Multi-Industry Experience is the number of industries at the SIC three-digit level
in which an executive had experienced before becoming CEO. Competition is dened as one minus the
Herndahl-Hirschman Index. The index ranges from zero to one and is constructed using Compustat
sale at the SIC three-digit code level. Variables Multi-Industry Experience and Competition are standard-
ized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Standard errors are clustered at the SIC three-digit
level and shown in the paratheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Total Compensationi,j,t = α+ β1Competitionj,t ×Multi-Industry Experiencei,t + β2Competitionj,t
+ β3Multi-Industry Experiencei,t + β4CEO Controlsi,t + Industry− YearFEj,t + i,j,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log_TDC1 Log_TDC1 Log_TDC2 Log_TDC2
Competition ×Multi-Industry Experience 0.038∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.034∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018)
Competition -0.071∗ -0.069 -0.089∗∗ -0.092∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044)
Multi-Industry Experience 0.139∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
CEO Age 0.005 0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Male CEO 0.088 0.118
(0.091) (0.079)
CEO Tenure -0.007 0.007
(0.004) (0.004)
Externally Hired CEO -0.098∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.048)
CEO is the chairperson 0.124∗∗∗ 0.086∗
(0.041) (0.045)
CEO has an MBA degree 0.005 0.050
(0.052) (0.052)
CEO has an Ivy League degree 0.161∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.044)
Industry-Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firm Years 15,007 14,976 15,062 15,031
Adj. R-Square 0.038 0.047 0.074 0.09052
Chapter 2: Peer Eects inCorporateGovernancePractices: Evidence from
Universal Demand Laws
1 Introduction
The impact of peers on rms’ and managers’ decisions has been the subject of a growing body of research in
the economic and nance literatures. Peer practices and decisions can convey information or cause changes
in the market environment that motivate rms and individuals to undertake similar actions. Theoretical
studies present dierent frameworks in which social interactions may inuence individual decisions (see,
for example, Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995; DeMarzo et al., 2003). However, because the composition of
peer groups and managerial decisions are endogenously determined, estimation of peer eects is a major
challenge for empirical studies in this literature (Manski, 1993).
In this paper, we propose a novel method to identify peer eects in the area of corporate governance.
We address two broad questions. First, do peer eects acting through board interlock networks inuence
rms’ decisions to adopt particular governance provisions? Second, can we identify the incentives that
underlie the propagation of governance practices across rms?
Board directors have an important role in passing and repealing governance provisions (Bebchuk, 2005;
Ertimur et al., 2010). Davis (1991) and Davis and Greve (1997) show that rms tend to adopt poison pills
and golden parachutes when other rms in their board interlock networks have adopted similar provisions.
Bouwman (2011) nds a link between board interlocks and the convergence of governance practices such
as board size, outside directors, CEO duality, and compensation.1 However, while peer eects may induce
rms to adopt similar practices, Bouwman suggests that these empirical associations could alternatively
arise from rms’ decisions to select directors who are board members at rms with similar governance
preferences. A clean identication strategy is required to establish a direct impact of peer groups on
governance practice.
In order to estimate peer eects, the identication strategy needs to deal with the possibility of reverse
causality and omitted variables that may confound the estimation. Bouwman (2011) notes that reverse
causality will arise when board-interlock networks are endogenously formed by rms with similar gov-
ernance philosophies. Moreover, omitted variable bias can result from an unobserved common shock that
causes all rms in a board interlock network to adopt similar practices. To overcome these concerns, we
1 Barzuza and Curtis (2014) provide a thorough review of studies on board interlocks and corporate governance.
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require an exogenous instrument for the propensity of rms to adopt specic governance provisions that
is orthogonal to both board interlock formations and common factors aecting all rms in a particular
network.
Our proposed instrument is the staggered passage of universal demand (UD) laws that govern only
rms incorporated in the aected states. In the period 1989-2005, 23 states passed UD laws requiring
the board’s approval for shareholders’ derivative litigation against directors and ocers. This staggered
passage is a relevant instrumental variable: Appel (2014) shows that after the passage of these laws, rms
increasingly adopted management- (as opposed to shareholder-) friendly governance provisions such as
poison pills, supermajority voting requirements, and classied boards. We nd that rms incorporated
in other states, but linked to aected companies through a pre-existing interlock network, are also more
likely to adopt such governance provisions, even when their states of incorporation have not themselves
adopted UD laws.
Figure 1 illustrates our method. UD laws were passed in Georgia in 1989 and in Virginia in 1992.
Consider two rms, Firm G in Georgia and Firm V in Virginia. Firms G and V are interlocked by two board
members; one is Ms. X, who was elected to both rms before 1989. This pre-existing interlock, therefore, is
presumably exogenous to the passage of the UD law in either state. However, once Ms. X is exposed to new
governance policies made feasible or preferable by the passage of the UD law in Georgia, her newly gained
experience may inuence her incentives and inform her actions on the board of Firm V, on which she also
serves. Crucially, because Ms. X was elected to both boards before UD laws were passed in either state, a
chain of inuence traceable to her would constitute evidence for a direct peer eect, not contaminated by
group self-selection.
[Figure 1 near here]
In contrast, Mr. Y was elected to both rms between 1989 and 1992. It is possible that Mr. Y’s selection
by Firm G may have been related in part to Georgia’s passage of the UD law. Therefore, to identify peer
eects, we wish to measure only Ms. X’s inuence as the transmission mechanism. We therefore focus
primarily on interlocks established before either state has a UD law in place. While we may use Mr. Y’s
inclusion on the board of Firm V as a control variable in explaining rms’ governance choices, the key
question will be how Ms. X’s experience in one state aects the decisions of rms in the other states on
54
which she serves.
The passage of UD laws addresses endogeneity concerns in several ways. First, UD laws are ratied
by state legislators and are likely to be independent of board interlock networks. Moreover, for each pair
of rms, we carefully select the interlocks that are already in place before the passage of a UD law aects
either rm in the pair. As illustrated in Figure 1, this procedure addresses the reverse causality concern
in which board interlocks are established by rms with common governance practices. Second, to deal
with unobserved common factors, we investigate peer eects in rm pairs where one rm is incorporated
in a state with a UD law and the other is incorporated in a dierent state without a UD law. By isolating
spillovers to the component that can be attributed to joint board members, we should eliminate the eects
of common shocks that potentially could aect both rms. Finally, the remaining concern is that we
will detect another eect (e.g., institutional investments) that is also triggered by the UD laws and ows
through director networks, thus leading to correlation with the adoption of governance provisions at both
rms. Although this mechanism is unlikely to generate our ndings, we will include a range of rm-level
control variables that are known to be correlated with the adoption of governance provisions to mitigate
this concern.
Our analysis produces several ndings. Our structural, 2SLS model shows that the projection of peer
governance practices onto the prior UD law experience of a rm’s interlocked directors is able to predict
the rm’s own governance practices. This projection is, by design, independent of potential self-selection
eects, and thus provides evidence in support of causal peer eects. Consistent with this structural model,
reduced form estimates conrm that rms with more board members who have experienced the passage
of UD laws through their membership in other boards are signicantly more likely to adopt several pro-
management governance provisions; when the portion of these directors in the board increases from zero
to 50 percent, rms’ entrenchment index (E-Index; Bebchuk et al., 2009) increases on average by 0.22
points, a substantial impact in the context of mean and median values of 2. The eect of board interlocks
is most signicant for poison pills, classied boards, and limits-to-change bylaws. Increasing the portion
of directors who have UD law experience by 50 percent raises rms’ propensities to adopt a poison pill by
9.8 percent, a classied board by 6.9 percent, and limits-to-change bylaws by 6.5 percent.
Next, we investigate the underlying mechanism for the spillover eects of governance practices among
board-interlocked rms. One channel for spillover eects could come from the impact of UD laws on direc-
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tors’ incentives. Levit and Malenko (2015) demonstrate the possibility of multiple governance equilibria.
In a "strong governance" equilibrium, value-maximizing and shareholder-friendly policies will enhance
the value of directors’ human capital. But in a "weak governance" equilibrium, that value will be enhanced
through management-friendly policies. When states pass UD laws, they ease the way for management-
friendly policies, and risk tilting the equilibrium toward the weak governance outcome. In this event,
aected rms are more likely to hire directors who are known for maintaining good relationships with
managers, and potential directors will signal their value by demonstrating an anity for management-
friendly governance provisions. Consistent with these dynamics, we nd that after the passage of a UD
law, rms in the aected states are increasingly prone to recruit directors who have experience in rms
with management-friendly governance. Further, our results suggest that interlocked board members who
sit on a board of a rm incorporated in a state that has passed a UD law are signicant actors in the adop-
tion of these governance provisions. Our empirical evidence for this transmission channel supports the
Levit-Malenko model.
This channel is also consistent with our ndings for the within-rm governance environment. We
show that in the process of adopting governance provisions, directors seem to consider relative power
across the board of directors, management, and shareholders as it aects their directorship outcomes.
Firms with more powerful shareholders should be less inuenced by the UD law experience of interlocked
directors when making decisions aecting shareholders’ ability to discipline entrenched management.
Consistent with this expectation, we nd that the eect of board experience with UD law is signicant for
rms with low institutional ownership, but insignicant in the presence of high institutional ownership.
Likewise, rms that employ governance provisions protecting management from takeover threats should
exhibit stronger eects of UD law experience. Using CEO duality as a proxy for management power, we
nd that the UD law experience of interlocked directors aects only rms for which CEOs are also the
board chairperson.
Our paper is related to two important strands of the corporate nance literature: the impact of peer
eects on corporate decisions, and the labor market for directors. The literature on peer eects in cor-
porations is relatively new and emerging. Recent studies have highlighted peer associations relating to
rms’ capital structure (Leary and Roberts, 2014), dividend payout (Popadak, 2014), and nancial miscon-
duct (Parsons et al., 2014). However, clean identication of a causal relationship is a major challenge for
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studies in this literature (Manski, 1993). As peer eects are not directly observable and are distinct from
other industry and location factors, rm xed-eects models cannot mitigate major concerns about reverse
causality and omitted variables. The identication challenge is tackled in previous studies using statistical
methods (Leary and Roberts, 2014; Popadak, 2014)2 or by controlled experiments (Shue, 2013; Ahern et al.,
2014). The advantage of employing state-level policy changes in our identication strategy is that it can be
executed for large samples of rms and for several dierent corporate decisions. Our ndings regarding
the role of board experience and the interaction among the board, management, and shareholders provide
further understanding of the underlying mechanism for peer eects.
Our paper also contributes to the literature investigating the role of reputation in the labor market
for directors. Directors presumably wish to build reputations regarding corporate governance so as to
maximize their career prospects. But as the Levit and Malenko (2015) model shows, multiple equilibria
are possible, and either management- or shareholder-friendly reputations may be optimal in dierent cir-
cumstances. One group of papers concludes that directors who are known as management-friendly are
rewarded by the market through seating in more boards. For instance, Helland (2006) concludes that
directors supporting weak governance actually enjoy a more successful career path. Using a sample of
boardroom disputes, Marshall (2010) nds that directors who resign in dissent from one board are not
rewarded by the market and suer higher probabilities of losing other positions in the ve years following
their resignation. However, another group of papers nds that a reputation for being shareholder friendly
is a valuable asset for directors. Fos et al. (2016) show that the closer directors of a board are to the end of
their directorship term, the more likely they are to act in favor of shareholders. Facing shareholder class
action lawsuits (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007) and proxy contests (Fos and Tsoutsoura, 2014) hurts a director’s
reputation and the likelihood of being selected for a directorship. Jiang et al. (2015) nd that dissention
from the board is rewarded in the form of outside directorships. Lel and Miller (2015) present cross-country
evidence that the labor market provides incentives for directors to monitor managers, particularly, in coun-
tries with strong investor protection. Our instrument allows us to demonstrate the potential impact of the
legal framework on the equilibrium in the market for directors’ services. Our results on the apparent shift
toward a weak-governance equilibrium after passage of UD laws are new evidence on the importance of
this determinant of corporate governance.
2To identify peer eects, Leary and Roberts (2014) use idiosyncratic equity returns as an exogenous variation to peer rms’
capital structure. Popadak (2014) identies the eects using three separate methods: excess-variance, instrumental variable, and
partial identication strategies.
57
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the institutional background
of UD laws and their impact on corporations. In Section 3, we describe our data and empirical strategy.
In Section 4, we develop our main hypotheses and in Section 5, we discuss the results of our tests. We
conclude in Section 6.
2 Institutional Background
2.1. Derivative Litigation
The importance of shareholder legal rights for corporate governance is well established (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997). A shareholder derivative lawsuit can be brought by a shareholder or group of shareholders
to reclaim value lost due to inappropriate management actions. As opposed to class action lawsuits in
which the plainti is a subset of shareholders, the plainti in derivative lawsuits represents the interests
of all shareholders. Therefore, derivative litigation can be a distinct legal mechanism to address agency
problems in public rms (Ferris et al., 2007; Appel, 2014).
A shareholder group can sue management only when the corporation has a valid cause of action, but
has refused to use it. This failure often emerges when the defendant in the suit is someone close to the
company, for example, a director or a corporate ocer. In such a case, the plainti will be the suing
shareholder(s) and the corporation, and the defendant will be the management or directors. In the suit, the
plainti shareholder(s) must prove that the management or directors have breached their duciary duties
either by performing or failing to perform certain actions. A key feature of this type of lawsuit is that if
it is successful, the proceeds go to the corporation, not to the shareholders who brought the suit. They
benet in part by the damages awarded to the rm, but more importantly, by eecting a change in policy.
Shareholder derivative litigation has become increasingly common in merger and acquisition transac-
tions. For example, shareholders in Bank of America, led by two pension funds, the Louisiana Municipal
Police Employees’ Retirement System and the Hollywood Police Ocers’ Retirement System in Florida,
sued the bank’s directors and former CEO, Kenneth Lewis, for misleading shareholders in the bank’s ac-
quisition of Merrill Lynch & Co. The shareholders claimed that the management and directors did not fully
disclose that Merrill’s losses totalled $15.84 billion in the fourth quarter of 2008 and that Merrill was still
paying $3.6 billion in bonuses in that quarter. The lawsuit was resolved with a settlement of $62.5 million
paid to the bank and a $20 million cash payout to shareholders for attorney’s fees.
As discussed, payouts in derivative lawsuits go to the corporation and are typically covered by the
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liability insurance of the rms’ directors. In some cases, however, the managers or directors will pay the
settlement to a separate entity with their own money. For instance, a derivative lawsuit was brought
against Lawrence J. Ellison, Oracle Corporation’s chief executive ocer, for insider trading in 2001. Mr.
Ellison was accused of selling Oracle shares worth approximately $894 million before disclosing that Oracle
would miss its earnings target. The stock dropped 45 percent after the news release. After four years of
litigation, Mr. Ellison agreed to pay with his own money a settlement of $100 million and $22 million in
legal fees. Since Mr. Ellison owned 24.5 percent of the rm, a direct payment to Oracle would benet Mr.
Ellison himself. Therefore, the settlement was paid in form of a charitable donation under Oracle’s name
to a charity chosen by the rm.
2.2. Universal Demand Laws
Although derivative litigation is intended to protect the interests of all shareholders, these lawsuits
have been criticized for primarily serving the narrow interests of the suing shareholders. Some studies
argue that derivative litigation is a means for the plaintis to extract settlement fees rather than to improve
corporate governance. In response to this criticism, 23 states passed Universal Demand (UD) laws between
1989 and 2005 to regulate shareholder derivative lawsuits. Table A1 (see Appendix) reports a full list of
states passing UD laws as well as the years in which those laws became eective.
Before commencing a derivative action against a purported wrongdoing, UD laws require shareholders
to rst make a written demand that the board of directors take corrective measures, but the board may
argue that such action would result in irreparable damage to the rm. The courts will dismiss a derivative
action that is initiated before the board has responded to the demand unless the board fails to respond
within a reasonable time.
As board directors are usually among the defendants in the derivative litigation, it is almost inevitable
that the board will decide against the action. Hence, UD laws have become a major roadblock for share-
holder derivative lawsuits in the aected states. Appel (2014) shows that after states pass UD laws, the
average number of derivative lawsuits drops by a third.
3 Data and Methodology
The most important part of our identication strategy is the construction of the main explanatory
variable, UD Law Experience of Existing Board. Our goal is to construct a variable that captures the prop-
agation through overlapping director networks of the eects of UD laws on the governance of rms in
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other, unaected states. There are three steps in constructing this variable: determining each rm’s state
of incorporation and headquarters, identifying board interlock networks, and constructing the rm-level
variable, UD Law Experience of Existing Board.
3.1. State of Incorporation and State of Headquarter
To deal with the potential for unobserved common factors to aect governance decisions, we track
decisions that derive from board interlocks across rms incorporated in dierent states. Since the passage
of UD laws in one state is unlikely to be correlated with an unobserved factor aecting rms in another
state, we mitigate concern about omitted variables. To collect each rm’s historical state of incorporation
and state of corporate headquarters, we use a web crawler to extract the relevant data from SEC lings
archived on the EDGAR server.3 As EDGAR contains lings only since 1994, we must use 1994 data
to ll in missing entries for previous years. We merge the data on state of incorporation and state of
headquarters with Compustat using the Central Index Key (CIK); for rms with missing CIK, we match
using IRS employer number. We then create a dummy variable equal to 1 for state-years in which UD laws
were passed as well as for following years. There are no cases in our sample where a UD law was later
reversed by a state that had passed one in earlier years.
3.2. Board Interlocks
We use BoardEx as the main data source for constructing board interlock networks. BoardEx started
collecting data on top managers and directors holding positions in public rms in 1999. The data were
backlled for managers’ and directors’ past positions, educational background, and other activities. Earliest
positions reported on BoardEx date back to the 1920s. The data contain a unique identication number for
each director, allowing us to identify interlock directors who sit on the boards of dierent rms. The data
also contain the start date and end date of each board position. This allows us to build a panel in which
each observation is a rm-director-position-year.
3.3. UD Law Experience
Next, we merge the board interlock data with data about the state of incorporation and the state of
corporate headquarters. Finally, UD Law Experience of Existing Board is constructed as follows. First, we
build an experience variable that shows whether each director has experienced a UD shock during the life
3 Compustat reports only the current state of incorporation and current state of headquarters. This does not allow us to track
rms that have been incorporated and reincorporated in dierent states during our sample period.
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of her directorship. We give an initial value of 1 to this variable if a person is a board member of a rm
incorporated in a state that passes a UD law. In Figure 1, if Ms. X is a board member of rm G in Georgia
in 1989 or thereafter, her experience variable for 1989 is set equal to one. However, we depreciate the
experience variable using an exponential decay function that depends on the time gap between the year
of each observation and the year in which the UD law was passed. In our example, assuming it is 1992 and
Ms. X experienced the passage of the UD law in 1989 in Georgia, then using a depreciation rate of 0.15,
the experience variable for Ms. X would equal exp(−.15 ∗ 3) = 0.64.4 Next, we sum the UD experience
values that each director receives from directorships in dierent rms in each year and truncate his or her
total value at a maximum value of one. Finally, we sum the experience value across the board members of
each rm to build an experience variable at the rm level. Therefore, if there are two board members of
Firm V in Virginia during 1992, and both of them experienced the passage of UD law in 1989 in Georgia,
then using a depreciation rate of .15, the experience value of Firm V in this year is set equal to 0.64 + 0.64
= 1.28. Note that variable UD Law Experience of Existing Board only considers board interlocks that are in
place before a UD law is passed in either rm’s home state. This minimizes any concern that our results
are driven by selection eects, i.e., rms’ decisions to appoint directors who already have prior UD law
experience.
The eects of board members who have already experienced UD law passage before joining the rm in
question are captured in the variableUDLawExperience of NewBoardMembers. This variable is constructed
similarly to UD Law Experience of Existing Board. In Figure 1, the UD experience of Mr. Y would be
measured by this variable. We normalize both of these variables, UD Law Experience of Existing Board and
UD Law Experience of New Board Members, by the total number of board members.
3.4. Corporate Governance
The data source for rms’ governance provisions is the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), for-
merly known as Riskmetrics, database. Since these data are available only every other year, we follow
the standard practice in the literature of lling in missing years with data from the previous year. We
focus on the E-Index and its six component provisions: poison pills, golden parachute, supermajority vot-
ing, classied boards, limits-to-change bylaws, and limits-to-change charter. We use ExecuComp to nd
4 The proper depreciation rate is largely a matter of guess-work. We choose 0.15 to give a half-life of 5 years. In the robustness
check Table A4, we try a 0.25 depreciation rate and obtain similar results. In Table A5, we do not use a depreciation rate but instead
employ a dummy variable set equal to 1 in the year when UD law is passed and the four subsequent years, and set equal to zero,
otherwise. We obtain similar results in this specication as well.
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CEO/Chairman duality for each rm-year.
Our sample begins in 1990. As in the rest of the literature (see for example, Knyazeva et al., 2013;
Appel, 2014; Appel et al., 2016), the sample ends in 2006. This ending date is chosen because the format of
the ISS governance database in the post-2006 period is inconsistent with that of the database in the period
from 1990 to 2006.
3.5. Control Variables
Our main control variable is Neighbor States UD Law Status which equals the number of neighboring
state(s) (based on the rm’s headquarters) that have passed a UD law. We include this control variable to
account for the possibility that the UD law status of neighboring states could inuence both the formation
of board interlocks and rms’ governance practices (John and Kadyrzhanova, 2008). Other control vari-
ables for rms’ characteristics are derived from Compustat and CRSP. These include: total assets, leverage
ratio, R&D expenditures, free cash ow, ROA, and rm age. The data appendix provides detail on the
construction of these variables. We winsorize all accounting variables at the 2/98% levels.
Our nal sample consists of 11,814 rm-years from 1990 to 2006. Table ?? reports the mean, median,
standard deviation, top decile and bottom decile of each variable used in our analysis.
[Table 1 about here]
3.6. Univariate Relations
Before presenting formal hypotheses and tests, we present some univariate relations to motivate the
analysis that follows. Table 2 shows some simple dierence-in-dierence statistics. In each case, the
treatment group comprises rms whose directors are exposed to adoptions of UD laws because of their
directorship positions in other rms in aected states. The control group comprises rms with similar asset
size and initial E-index, but without directors exposed to such changes. We would expect the treatment
group to exhibit no systematic dierences in governance practices compared to the control group in the
pre-UD ve-year period, but a greater proclivity for management-friendly policies in the post-UD ve-year
period. Column (3) shows that the dierence in the E-index between the two groups increases by 0.098
in the post-UD period, statistically signicant at 5 percent. The dierence in each individual component
of the E-index also increases, but given the greater noise in the components, only one of the changes is
statistically signicant.
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[Table 2 about here]
Figure 2 examines the time trend of the E-index following adoption of UD laws in states connected
to the treatment group through a director network. The adoption of the law takes place sometime in the
rst scal-event-year, which in Figure 1 is between time -1 and time 0. The evolution of the E-index of
the treatment rms can be contrasted with that of several control groups. The various controls in the four
panels of the gure are formed by alternative matching criteria, including rm size in year 0, the initial
E-index in earlier years (either 3 or 5 years prior to the passage of the UD law), and/or industry SIC code.
For all matching criteria, the gure shows that the dierence in the E-index between the treatment and
control group noticeably rises in years 1 and 2 before generally leveling out.
[Figure 2 about here]
It appears that the passage of UD laws in one state aects the governance of rms in unaected states, at
least when there is a connection through interlocked directors. However, more formal analysis is required
to pin down the transmission mechanism.
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
The main hypothesis that we wish to test is whether (and how) existing director networks inuence
rms’ propensities to mimic the governance provisions of connected rms. This is expressed in the fol-
lowing formal hypothesis.
• Hypothesis 1: Firms that share directors with other rms that have experienced the passage of UD Laws
are more likely to adopt similar management-friendly governance provisions.
Our hypotheses will be tested in a regression framework in which adoption of various governance pro-
visions, or the E-Index summarizing several of these provisions, is the dependent variable. While our
hypotheses deal with the impact of UD laws on the propagation of governance practice, we will begin
with a simple specication, similar to those already in the literature, showing that board interlocks predict
similarity of governance provisions. This regression simply allows us to compare the associations in our
sample with those documented in previous studies (Davis, 1991; Davis and Greve, 1997; Bouwman, 2011).
As in these studies, we construct a sample comprising all rms that themselves are not subject to UD laws,
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but which have a connection through interlocked directors to rms that are subject to such laws. We es-
timate the following regression model:
(1)Firm Governancei,s,t+1 = β1Peer Governancei,t + θi + γs,t + σi,s,t+1
where Firm Governancei,s,t+1 in various specications denotes either the E-Index or a specic governance
provision of rm i in state of incorporation s, and year t + 1. Peer Governancei,t is the average value of
that particular governance provision in other rms at which interlocked directors have board seats. θi is
the rm xed-eect, and γs,t is the state-year xed eect.
Table 3 reports rm xed-eects regressions, without instruments and with control variables included.
The results are similar to those presented elsewhere in the literature. Each dependent variable is a gover-
nance practice, or the E-Index of each rm, and the explanatory variables are the average value of those
same practices for rms with interlocked boards. The coecients of E-Index, Classied Board, Bylaw
Limits, and Charter Limits are positive and statistically signicant at levels ranging from 1 percent to 10
percent, conrming a peer correlation in governance patterns across rms. While most of these results
simply conrm prior ndings, some dier. For example, we nd that golden parachutes are less likely to
spread through board interlock networks. One potential explanation for this dierence is that our sample
diers, including more rm-year observations. Moreover, as noted, these tests cannot distinguish between
causal peer eects versus selection eects of directors across like-minded rms.
[Table 3 about here]
4.1. UD Law-Based Estimates
As discussed above, endogeneity issues call into question the results in Table 3. Using the staggered
passage of universal demand (UD) laws as an exogenous instrument aecting adoption of governance
provisions, we are able address these concerns and disentangle peer eects from other mechanisms that
might explain these results. Appel (2014) documents that rms in UD law states are systematically more
management friendly, as evidenced by their higher E-Indexes and higher propensities to adopt component
provisions. We replicate the tests in Appel (2014) and report these results in Table A3 in the Appendix.
The passage of UD laws appears correlated with management-friendly governance provisions and meets
the relevance condition for the instrument in our analysis.
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The structural equation we wish to estimate is essentially the same as Equation 1. However, to deal
with the likely endogeneity of the Peer Governance variable, we re-estimate the equation in an IV-2SLS
framework. In the rst stage, we t Peer Governance onto our instrumental variable, UD Law Experience
of Existing Board, and then use the tted value of this variable in the second-stage regression.
Therefore the rst-stage regression is:
(2)Peer Governancei,s,t = β1UD Law Experience of Existing Boardi,t
+ θi + γs,t + σi,s,t
In the second-stage regression, we replace Peer Governance with its tted value from equation 2 and
thus estimate equation 3:
(3)Firm Governancei,s,t+1 = β1Instrumented Peer Governancei,s,t
+ Firm Controlsi,s,t + θi + γs,t + σi,s,t+1
where Firm Controlsi,s,t is a vector of control variables for rm characteristics, θi is the rm xed eect,
and γs,t is the state-year xed eect. The 2SLS procedure ensures that the portion of peer governance that
can be attributed to UD law experience, but not the portion due to self-selection, is allowed to inuence
governance in the treatment rms in the second-stage regression.
Table 4 reports estimates of the rst-stage equation 2, which is the relation between interlocked direc-
tors’ UD Law experience, UD Law Experience of Existing Membersi,t, and interlocked directors’ governance
experience at peer rms, Peer Governancei,s,t. Interlocked directors’ UD Law experience is strongly pre-
dictive of management-friendly governance provisions at peer rms. The results hold with the inclusion
of rm xed-eects, state-year xed-eects, and rm controls. Specically, when the portion of board
directors with UD Law experience increases from zero to 50 percent, the average E-Index of peer rms
increases by 0.62 points, and the propensities of passing Poison Pill, Classied Board, Golden Parachute,
and Supermajority Voting provisions increase respectively by 19.4 percent, 13 percent, 21.9 percent, and
4.1 percent. Except for the Supermajority Voting model, the coecients are statistically signicant at the 1
percent level. Moreover, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, which is 12.1 for Classied Board and greater
than 20 for E-Index, Poison Pill, Golden Parachute, suggests that UD Law Experience of Existing Board
is unlikely to be a weak instrument. Our rst-stage results indicate that interlocked directors’ UD Law
experience is a strong predictor of interlocked directors’ governance experience at peer rms.
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[Table 4 about here]
Table 5 reports estimates of the second-stage regression, Equation 3. The coecients on the instru-
mented peer rms’ governance are positive and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level in the models
for E-Index, Poison Pill, and Classied Board. A one point increase in the instrumented E-Index of peer
rms leads to an increase of 0.34 point in E-Index of the rm of interest. Poison Pill and Classied Board
are the two component provisions that contribute the most to the detected eect. If the portion of peer
rms which have poison pill and classied board provisions in place each increase from zero to 50 percent,
the rm of interest is 28.3 percent more likely to adopt a poison pill provision and 25.6 percent more likely
to adopt a classied board provision.
[Table 5 about here]
As an alternative to the 2SLS estimation, we also estimate a reduced form version of our model, in
which we specify governance practice as a function of UD Law Experience of Existing Board as well as UD
Law Experience of New Board Members. The specic regression equation is:
(4)Firm Governancei,s,t+1 = β1UD Law Experience of Existing Boardi,t
+ β2UD Law Experience of New Board Membersi,t + θi + γs,t + σi,s,t+1
where Firm Governancei,j,k,s,t+1 is either the E-Index or each governance provision of rm i, in state of
incorporation s, in year t+1. We emphasize that the sample period for this regression includes only years
in which the second rm’s state has not yet adopted a UD law. Therefore, a convergence of governance
practices is presumably due only to the two rms’ common, interlocked directors, and cannot be a common
response to similar changes in their regulatory environments. The coecient of UD Law Experience of
Existing Boardi,t, described in Section 2, is our main coecient of interest. This coecient tests the impact
of those interlocked board members who were appointed before either state put in place a UD law.
UD Law Experience of New Board Membersi,t, described in Section 2, is a control for the impact of di-
rectors appointed after the passage of a UD law in one state, but its coecient may also reect endogenous
peer-group formation eects. θi is the rm xed-eect and γj,t is the state-year xed eect. To ensure
that time-varying characteristics are not driving the results, we control for the number of neighboring
states that have already passed a UD Law, as well as total assets, rm age, book leverage, R&D, free cash
ow, and return on assets.
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Table 6 reports the estimation for regression equation 4. The results reported in Panel A, which does not
control for rm characteristics (but does include both rm- and state-year xed eects), suggest that rms
are more likely to adopt management-friendly governance provisions when other rms in their director
networks have experienced the passage of UD laws. The coecient of primary interest, UD Law Experience
of Existing Board, is positive and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level for the E-Index. It also is
positive and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level for Poison Pills, Classied Board, and Bylaw
Limits. If the portion of the board directors who have UD Law experience through interlocked boards
increases from zero to 50 percent, E-Index rises on average by 0.22 points, an increase equivalent to 11
percent of the mean and median values of the E-Index of 2. Regarding component governance provisions,
increasing the portion of directors who have UD law experience by 50 percent raises a rm’s propensity
to adopt a poison pill by 9.8 percent, a classied board by 6.9 percent, and limits-to-change bylaws by 6.5
percent.
Panel B of the table reports results where other time-varying rm controls are also included. Speci-
cally, we control for the number of neighboring states that already passed UD Law, total assets, rm age,
book leverage, R&D expenditures, free cash ow, and return on assets. The economic and statistical signif-
icance of β1, the coecient on the UD Law Experience of Existing Board Members (i.e., members appointed
to both boards before either state passed a UD law), are mostly unchanged. The coecients on the expe-
rience of new board members (those appointed after the rst state implemented a UD law) are generally
larger than the coecient on our instrumental variable. This highlights the potential importance of endo-
geneity biases. It is likely that the higher point estimates for the impact of the new directors reects at least
in part selection and matching biases. In Panel B, it is notable that the coecient on UD Law Experience of
Existing Board is negative in the model for Charter Limits. However, the impact is only signicant at the
10 percent level and is economically small, reducing rms’ propensity to adopt the provision by only 2.4
percent.
[Table 6 about here]
To conclude, our empirical strategy using UD Law as an instrument cleanly identies governance
practices of peer rms as an important factor explaining rms’ decisions to adopt corporate governance
provisions. Both the structural and reduced-form versions of the model tell a consistent story. In the
next part of the paper, we provide further analysis to suggest that the reaction of interlocked directors
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to the change in the governance environment is a likely channel through which governance practices are
propagated among interlocked rms.
4.2. Director Reputation and the Market for Director Services
Directors’ desire to optimize their career outcomes could explain peer-eects in governance practices.
In the Levit and Malenko (2015) model, regulatory changes may help determine whether the economy
settles on a strong- or weak-governance equilibrium. In a weak-governance equilibrium, a management-
friendly environment can engender higher demand by corporations for directors with management-friendly
reputations. On the supply side, to maximize their directorship prospects, directors may choose to act in
favor of shareholders [in a strong-governance equilibrium] or management [in a weak-governance equi-
librium] to signal that they are of the director type preferred by the market. The passage of UD laws,
which favors a weak-governance equilibrium, oers an opportunity to test this model. Therefore, we pose
the following hypothesis:
•Hypothesis 2: The demand for experienced management-friendly directors rises after states pass UD laws.
To test this hypothesis, we estimate a regression equation in which each observation corresponds to
a rm-year in which new directors are elected to a board. The dependent variable is the reputation of
the appointees to each rm’s board, as measured by the average value of the E-Index of the rms for
which they have previously served (or by the average value of a specic component of the E-Index). The
explanatory variable is an indicator variable for whether the rm’s state of incorporation has ratied a UD
law. We hypothesize that rms in UD-law states are more likely to hire directors from rms with more
management-friendly governance practices.
The results in Table 7 conrm that passage of UD law favors the recruitment of management-friendly
directors. In the model for the E-Index (column 1), the coecient on the post-UD law dummy is positive
and highly signicant at better than the 1 percent level. Similarly, the coecients on the Post-UD Law
dummy are signicant in explaining two of the components of the E-Index.5 The results indicate that the
passage of a UD law makes directors who have served on management-friendly boards in other states
more attractive to the rm. As such, it supports the Levit and Malenko (2015) proposition that regulatory
changes can tilt the system toward a weak-governance equilibrium.
[Table 7 about here]
5 In another specication, we replace state xed-eects with rm xed-eects. The coecient on Post UD Law is signicant
at the 5 percent level and has similar economic magnitude. The results of this specication are reported in Table A7.
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The results in Table 7 show that the demand for directors with management-friendly reputation in-
creases when the legal environment encourages a "weak governance" equilibrium. In the following step,
we examine the response of interlocked directors to the increased incentives they face to demonstrate a
management-friendly orientation. Specically, we test whether the passage of a UD law in a state where
interlocked directors have board seats makes them more likely to adopt management-friendly governance
provisions at rms in other states where UD laws are not in place.
•Hypothesis 3: After one state has passed UD laws, interlocked directors who have board seats at rms in
that state are more likely to adopt management-friendly governance provisions for their rms in other
states where UD laws have not been passed.
We use the following model to test this hypothesis, for each director-year (utilizing directors of rms
in states that have passed UD laws):
(5)Firm Governancej,i,s,t+1 = β1Directors ′ UD Law Dummyj,t + Firm Controlsi,s,t
+ωj + γs,t + σj,i,s,t+1
where j, i, s and t denote director j, rm i, state of incorporation s, and year t. The dependent variable is
the E-Index or one of its six component governance provisions of a rm in a state that has not been aected
by a change in the UD Laws (but which may have directors that have been aected via their other direc-
torship). The independent variable, Directors’ UD Law Dummyj,t, is a dummy variable indicating whether
the directors have board seats in a state where UD laws have been passed. ωi is the rm xed-eect, γs,t
is the state-year xed eect. Our initial sample is all board position-years of interlocked directors. Then,
we remove all the position-years after UD laws come into eect since we are only interested in rms in
states where UD laws have not yet been passed.
Table 8 presents the results of this specication. The coecient on Directors’ UD Law Dummy is posi-
tively and statistically signicant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels for the E-Index and three component
provisions. When an interlocked director experiences the passage of UD laws at one rm, the E-Index of
other rms where he/she has a board seat increase by 0.09 point. The eect derives largely from the
increased propensity to adopt poison pill, 3.7 percent, classied board, 3.6 percent, and limit-to-change
bylaws, 0.7 percent.
[Table 8 about here]
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In sum, the test results for Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 indicate that interlocked board members’
incentive to maximize their career prospects is a plausible channel through which governance practices
are propagated among boards of directors.
4.3. Within-Firm Governance Environment
We expand our analysis further by investigating the within-rm governance environment. If directors
attempt to foster their career prospects as we hypothesize, the spillover eect in provision adoption is
likely to be aected by the relative power of shareholders and management. When shareholders are more
powerful, the directors will presumably refrain from the adoption of governance provisions that serve
to entrench management. Conversely, when managers are more powerful, the directors will be more
inclined to adopt these provisions to maximize their career outcomes. We use both the level of institutional
ownership and CEO duality as indicators of shareholders’ power. Therefore, Hypotheses 4A and 4B are:
•Hypothesis 4A: Firms with less institutional ownership that share director networks with rms that have
experienced the passage of UD Laws are more likely to adopt similar governance provisions.
•Hypothesis 4B: Firms with CEO duality that share director networks with rms that have experienced the
passage of UD Laws are more likely to adopt similar governance provisions.
We expect the coecient on UD Law Experience of Existing Board to be greater for rms with less
powerful management. Therefore, we expect that β1 in equation (4) for rms in the lowest quartile of
institutional ownership will be positive and signicant but will not necessarily signicantly dier from
zero for rms in the fourth quartile. Hypothesis 4B is similar, except that it uses CEO duality as a measure
of management power. In rms with duality, the CEO has more power, and board members are more prone
to act in his or her favor when considering governance provisions. Therefore, β1 will be higher for rms
with CEO duality: Interlocked members with UD backgrounds may use their experience with other rms
to help management in the process of adopting these provisions.
Table 9 reports results for rms stratied by level of institutional ownership. For the rm in the low-
est quartile of institutional ownership (Panel A), the coecient on the UD experience of existing board
members is positive and statistically signicant at the 5 percent level in explaining the E-Index and at the
1 percent to 10 percent levels in explaining three component provisions.6 In contrast, the coecient on
6 Like Table 6, this table and the next use data only from before the adoption of a UD law in the second state. This ensures
that any changes in governance cannot be attributed to the adoption of a UD law in that state. This regression design assures that
the only transmission mechanism can be through the interlocked directors who have gained UD law experience in their other
directorships.
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UD Law experience is near zero and is not signicantly dierent from zero for the high institutional own-
ership quartile. Similarly, none of the models for individual components of the E-Index generally produce
statistically signicant coecients.
[Table 9 about here]
Table 10 reports tests of Hypothesis 4B where CEO duality is used as a measure of management power.
For rms with CEO duality, the coecient on UD Law experience is signicant at 1 percent in explain-
ing the E-Index (Panel A), but that coecient is not signicant for rms without CEO duality (Panel B).
Turning to the component governance provisions of the E-Index for rms with CEO duality (Panel A),
the Classied Board and Bylaw Limits models show positive and statistically signicant coecients on
UD law experience at the 1 percent level, but for rms without CEO duality (Panel B), only the Bylaw
Limits model has a positive and signicant coecient. These results are consistent with our expectation
that more powerful shareholders would weaken the spillover eect of provision adoption through director
networks while more powerful management would enhance the eect.
[Table 10 about here]
5 Conclusion
While convergence of governance practices among rms linked through board interlocks has long
been noted, the source of that convergence is extremely dicult to ascertain. It may be attributable to
peer eects, whereby directors on one board are inuenced by the experience and preferences of their
peers. On the other hand, apparent convergence also would be observed simply through selection eects,
in which rms with similar governance preferences recruit directors with similar preferences.
To tease out peer eects, one requires an instrument that is related to governance practice, but is
unrelated to selection eects. The staggered adoption of Universal Demand laws across states provides
just such an instrument. We nd that after the passage of such laws, rms in aected states increasingly
adopt management-friendly governance provisions. We also show that the management-friendly policies
adopted by a rm governed by a UD law tend to be mimicked by other rms within that interlocked
director network. Crucially, by restricting the sample to networks formed by appointments to boards of
rm pairs prior to the adoption of a UD law by the state of either rm, we can be condent that this
apparent propagation of policy cannot be due to selection eects.
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One transmission mechanism seems to work through the market for director services. In a strong-
governance equilibrium, directors will increase the value of their human capital by signaling a proclivity
for shareholder-friendly governance. But in a weak-governance equilibrium, a management-friendly repu-
tation will be optimal. Universal Demand laws, which make it harder to sue directors for dereliction of their
duties toward shareholders, can tilt the equilibrium toward the weak-governance outcome. We nd that af-
ter passage of such laws, rms are more likely to recruit directors currently serving on other management-
friendly boards; interlocked directors are thus incentivized to signal that they are management-friendly.
Moreover, directors’ career considerations seem to respond to the balance of power among directors, man-
agement, and shareholders. Directors in rms with fewer strong shareholders are more prone to respond
to UD laws with management-friendly governance provisions. Similarly, they are more inclined to adopt
such provisions when the CEO is stronger.
We conclude that regulation can aect the nature of the equilibrium in the market for directors’ services
by changing the incentives faced by directors in dealing with conicts of interest between managers and
shareholders.
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1989: GA passes UD Law
Firm G in GA
1989
1992: VA passes UD Law
XFirm V in VA
Ms. X: Interlock director
who was elected to both Firm G
and Firm V before passage of UD law
Mr. Y: Interlock director
who was elected to
Firm V after passage of UD law
Figure 1: Hypothetical Timeline for Adoption of Universal Demand Laws
Time line showing hypothetical adoption of UD laws in two states and the appointment of board mem-
bers of two rms in those states. Georgia adopts UD laws in 1989 and Virginia in 1992. Ms. X is
appointed to both boards before the adoption of UD laws in either state. However, Mr. Y is appointed
to both boards sometime between 1989 and 1992.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean p10 p50 p90 S.D. N
UD Law Experience of Existing Board 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.05 11,814
UD Law Experience of New Board Members 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 11,814
E-Index 2.07 0.00 2.00 4.00 1.31 11,814
Poison Pill 0.55 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 11,814
Classied Board 0.57 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 11,814
Golden Parachute 0.59 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 11,814
Supermajority 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.36 11,814
Limits to Amend Bylaws 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 11,814
Limits to Amend Charter 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 11,814
Neighbour States UD Law Status 1.54 0.00 1.00 3.00 1.21 11,814
Total Assets 7.22 5.47 7.07 9.29 1.45 11,814
Book Leverage 0.37 0.00 0.36 0.73 0.31 11,814
R&D to Assets 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.07 11,814
Free Cash Flow 0.21 0.02 0.18 0.43 0.21 11,814
Return on Assets 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.23 0.12 11,814
Firm Age 26.79 8.00 26.00 48.00 15.26 11,814
New Directors’ Reputation
E-Index Reputation 2.19 1.00 2.00 3.50 1.09 2,200
Poison Pill Reputation 0.58 0.00 0.67 1.00 0.42 2,200
Classied Board Reputation 0.59 0.00 0.67 1.00 0.42 2,200
Golden Parachute Reputation 0.66 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.41 2,200
Supermajority Voting Reputation 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.31 2,200
Charter Limits Reputation 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 2,200
Bylaw Limits Reputation 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.33 2,200
Details about variable contruction as in Appendix ??
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Table 2: Univariate Analysis
In this table, we examine the eect of a change in board members’ experience of passing Uni-
versal Demand laws in other states on governance practices in place. The sample consists of
rm-year observations between 1995 and 2001. This sample includes rms that experience
the change in this period, the treatment group, and rms that do not experience the change,
the control group. The rst two columns show the dierence of governance provisions be-
fore the change in the experience of board members and after the change in the experience.
The third column shows the dierence between the dierences before and after the change
in experience, and the t-stat of the dierence shown in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-UD Experience Post-UD Experience Pre-Post Dierence
E-Index 0.264 0.386 0.098∗∗ (2.151)
Poison Pill 0.067 0.078 0.002 (0.063)
Classied Board 0.093 0.101 0.002 (0.151)
Golden Parachute 0.013 0.088 0.073∗∗∗ (2.755)
Supermajority Voting 0.012 0.031 0.013 (1.131)
Charter Limits -0.003 0.006 0.008 (1.348)
Bylaw Limits 0.082 0.083 0.001 (0.082)
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Table 3: Board Interlocks and Adoption of Governance Provisions
The dependent variables are E-Index and each of the six provisions contained in the index. Governance
data are from ISS from 1990 to 2006. The main independent variable is average value of the governance
practice of other rms at which interlocked directors have board seats. Firm xed-eects and state of
incorporation-year xed-eects are included in all specications. Standard errors are clustered at the
state of incorporation-year level and shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signicance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Firm Governanceist = β1Peer Governanceit + θi + γst + σist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
E-Index Poison Pill ClassiedBoard
Golden
Parachute
Supermajority
Voting
Bylaw
Limits
Charter
Limits
E-Index 0.023∗∗∗
(0.006)
Poison Pill 0.013
(0.010)
Classied Board 0.019∗∗∗
(0.005)
Golden Parachute 0.012
(0.012)
Supermajority Voting -0.005
(0.008)
Bylaw Limits 0.018∗∗
(0.008)
Charter Limits 0.014∗
(0.008)
Firm Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Year Fixed-Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firm-Years 12,278 12,278 12,278 12,278 12,278 12,278 12,278
Adj. R-Square 0.861 0.747 0.917 0.681 0.886 0.885 0.846
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Table A1: Universal Demand Legislation
This table lists the states of incorporation with universal demand (UD) laws and the corresponding
eective year and statute reference. The nal column reports the number of rm-year observations in
the sample. Source: Appel (2014)
Year State Citation
1989 GA Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-742
MI Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.1493a
1990 FL Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.07401
1991 WI Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.742
1992 MT Mont. Code. Ann. § 35-1-543
VA Va. Code Ann § 13.1-672.1B
UT Utah Code. Ann. § 16-10a-740(3)
1993 NH N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-A:7.42
MS Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-7.42
1995 NC N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-7-42
1996 AZ Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-742
NE Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2072
1997 CT Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-722
ME Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-C, § 753
PA Cuker v. Mikalauskas (547 Pa. 600, 692 A.2d 1042)
TX Tex. Bus. Org. Code. Ann. 607.07401
WY Wyo. Stat. § 17-16-742
1998 ID Idaho Code § 30-1-742
2001 HI Haw. Rev. Stat. § 414-173
2003 IA Iowa Code Ann. § 490.742
2004 MA Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. Ch. 156D, § 7.42
2005 RI R.I. Gen. Laws. § 7-1.2-710(C)
SD S.D. Codied Laws 47-1A-742
87
Table A2: Variable Description
Variable Denition
UD Law Experience of Existing Board Experience of board interlocks that are in place before a UD law
is passed in either rm’s home state
UD Law Experience of New Board Members Experience of board interlocks who join the rm after a UD law
is passed in either rm’s home state
Neighbor States UD Law Status A dummy variable that is equal to one if one of the neighbor states
has passed UD law.
New Directors’ Reputation Average governance practices of the rms in which an interlock
director has served as a board member in the ve years prior
to joining a new rm
Logarithm of Total Assets Logarithm of lagged asset value in COMPUSTAT
Book Leverage Book value of debt(long-term debt + current liabilities) divided
by the sum of book value of debt and book value of equity
R&D to Assets R&D expenses in COMPUSTAT divided by lagged asset value
Free Cash Flow Operating activities net cash ow minus investing activities
net cash ow divided by lagged asset value
Return on Assets Earnings before interest and tax divided by lagged asset value
88
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Chapter 3: Does Your Daughter Make You a Better CEO? 
1. Introduction 
Behavioral differences in gender have attracted considerable attention in economics, 
psychology, and other fields. These literatures commonly find that females are associated with many 
positive economic and social outcomes (Duflo 2012, Doepke, Tertilt and Voena 2012). In 
investments, Barber and Odean (2001) find that female investors outperform male counterparts 
because they are less subject to overconfidence. In corporate settings, female managers have been 
shown to execute more prudent corporate decisions (Huang and Kisgen 2013). These lead the next 
big question: since females have many such better characteristics like, do they have a positive 
influence on the performance of people around? If yes, this has very important implication because 
then females have a spreading impact beyond their own performance. If so, we would think that in a 
company where there is a high female representation, they may have a positive influence on the 
(even male) CEO behavior and corporate outcomes. However, it would be difficult to separate 
channels of effect in such a setting.  
To address the question, this paper takes advantage of a natural experiment, offspring 
gender mix, which randomly changes the interaction of CEOs with females but is unrelated to 
corporate policies. Other literatures have shown that within a family of a given size, the gender mix 
of the children is random (Bogan 2013). Therefore, after controlling for the number of children, 
CEOs’ daughter parenting experience is exogenous. If females have spreading impact, I expect that 
CEOs with more daughters to outperform their counterparts with fewer daughters. This paper aims 
to test this premise. 
My analysis leads to several findings. I find that corporate decisions made by CEOs with 
more daughters are better received by the market. Acquisitions made by a CEO with one more 
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daughter have 0.27 percentage point higher announcement returns.  This reward comes from the 
lower tendency of the CEO to overpay the targets. One more daughter is associated with 2.93 
percentage point decrease in acquisition premium. Debt issuance and equity issuance also enjoy 0.55 
and 0.25 percent higher announcement returns, respectively. I find that CEOs with more daughters 
manage to have stronger profitability after raising capital. Moreover, I show that CEOs’ daughter(s) 
increase(s) firm value through lowering corporate litigation. One more daughter is associated with 
0.14 to 0.24 fewer social related lawsuits per annum. This result is consistent with sociology 
literature which shows that daughters cause parents to adopt more progressive views on equality, 
labor relations, environment, health, energy. 
The effects of CEO’s daughter parenting experience on firm policies can act through two 
channels. First, CEOs’ daughter parenting experience makes the CEOs more prudent in deciding 
corporate policies. Second, well-performing firms are endogenously matched with CEOs who have 
more daughters. However, both show that CEOs with daughter(s) are perceived as having valuable 
characteristics. I find evidence supporting the first implication of these results. Huang and Kisgen 
(2013) indicate that female managers outperform because they are less likely to be overconfident. 
Using CEOs’ stock option exercises to assess CEOs’ confidence level, I show that CEOs with more 
daughters are also less likely to be overconfident. One more daughter decreases the average 
moneyness of CEOs’ option portfolio by 36.62 percentage points. This result is evident that 
daughter parenting experience helps CEOs make better corporate decisions. 
Since CEOs are not randomly assigned to firms, the endogenous matching between 
companies and CEOs can be another interpretation. A possible omitted variable may determine 
both the CEO selection and firm performance. I employ fixed-effect models to minimize potential 
bias induced by unobserved time-invariant factors. Moreover, if there are unobserved time-variant 
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factors that drive the results, daughter parenting experience is still a factor contributing to the 
CEO’s ability to implement outcomes detected in this paper. Nevertheless, I directly test whether 
CEOs’ daughter(s) are an important factor in the CEO-firm matching. My hypothesis is that on the 
one hand if firms intentionally choose managers with a desirable characteristic to implement new 
policies, the companies should pay a premium to attract the managers. On the other hand, if 
managers choose firms which match their preferences, there should be a discount in compensations 
to reflect the additional benefit to the managers. Using first-year compensations to measure the 
possible premium, I do not find any significant relationship between CEOs’ daughter(s) and the 
compensations. This is evident that CEOs’ daughter(s) do(es) not play an important role in 
matching CEOs and firms.  
To my best knowledge, this paper is the first study examining the effects of offspring on 
managers’ managing styles in U.S. corporations. My findings contribute to the literature on the 
relationship between managing styles and corporate outcomes. There are growing anecdotal and 
academic evidence that managing styles, skills, and preferences affect the managers’ corporate 
decisions and firm outcomes. High-profile CEOs such as Jack Welch and Steve Jobs are recognized 
for transforming their firms into leaders in the industry. The rise of private equity and leverage buy-
out activities is evident that management does matter for creating firm value.   
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that CEO fixed-effects are significant in companies’ 
investment decisions, financial decisions, organizational strategy, and performance. Other papers 
disentangle different managing styles and characteristics which affect firm outcomes. Cain and 
McKeon (2014) and Bernile et al. (2014) show that CEOs’ risk aversion is associated with firm risks. 
Cheng et al. (2014), Masulis and Reza (2015) find the link between CEOs’ charity preference and 
firms’ philanthropy engagement. Other papers identify the impact of inherent traits such as 
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managers’ gender and appearance on corporate policies (Huang and Kisgen 2013, Graham et al. 
2014). Managers’ peer interactions affect firms’ decisions in a range of policies including executive 
compensation, acquisitions strategy, investment, and financial policy (Shue 2013). Custodio and 
Metzger (2014) find that CEOs’ financial expertise significantly affects firms’ financial policy. My 
paper contributes to this literature by showing that CEOs’ daughter parenting experience can impact 
firm policies.  
My paper is also related to the literature on the effects of experiences on financial decisions. 
Neoclassical and behavioral economics hold different views about the effects of experience on 
individual’s risk preference. According to neoclassical view, individuals’ risk preference is stable and 
unaltered by experiences (Malmendier and Nagel 2011). However, economics and psychology 
literatures have shown that experiences can cause individuals to make decisions that differ from 
those predicted by the expected utility theory (e.g. Nisbett and Ross 1980; Weber et al. 1993; 
Hertwig et al. 2004; Hertwig and Erev 2009). In finance literature, there is also evidence that 
individual experiences affect both individual (Kaustia and Knupfer 2008) and corporate financial 
decisions (Dittmar and Duchin 2014). My paper highlights the role of experience in corporate 
decisions.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I develop main hypotheses in this 
paper; in Section 3, I describe the data; in Section 4, I provide the main empirical strategy and 
findings; and in Section 5, I conclude.  
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2. Main Hypotheses 
 
I start by examining the impact of daughters on firm value through important corporate 
decisions: acquisitions, debt issuance, and equity issuance. Mergers and acquisitions provide an ideal 
setting to test the impact of CEOs’ preferences on corporate policies. First, acquisition transactions 
are usually large and externally observable. Second, CEOs have extensive discretion throughout the 
merger and acquisition process which can be used for their benefits (Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
Third, the market reaction around acquisition-related events provides a fair opinion about CEO 
quality (Jacobsen 2014) and the transaction quality (Huang and Kisgen 2013). Debt and equity 
offerings are also important decisions where more information about the firm’s growth prospects is 
revealed through required filings and inferred by the market through the choice of debt or equity 
(Myer and Majluf 1984) 
Hypothesis 1: Firms where CEOs have more daughters have higher abnormal announcement returns 
than firms where CEOs have fewer daughters. 
There are several ways through which CEOs’ daughter increase firm value in acquisitions, 
debt issuance, and equity issuance. For acquisitions, CEOs’ daughter(s) can increase firm value in 
acquisitions by decreasing the likelihood that the acquirers overpay the targets. Roll (1986) suggests 
that overconfident managers try to maximize value, but overestimate the value of the target firm and 
overpay. Jacobsen (2014) find that the market rewards CEOs who withdraw from acquisitions when 
the price becomes increasingly expensive. Therefore, CEOs’ daughter(s) can increase firm value by 
reducing CEOs’ tendency to overpay the targets. To test this proposition, I examine the premium 
paid for the targets in my acquisition sample. 
Hypothesis 1a: Firms where CEOs have more daughters offer lower acquisition premium than firms 
where CEOs have fewer daughters. 
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For debt and equity offerings, the companies’ ability to pursue positive-NPV projects 
determines whether the issuances are well received by the market. CEOs with daughter(s) can create 
firm value by making more prudent investment decisions. In this test, I examine whether firms 
where CEOs have daughters deliver better post-issuance profitability, measured by Return on Assets 
(ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). 
Hypothesis 1b: Firms where CEOs have more daughters deliver higher post-issuance profitability than 
firms where CEOs have fewer daughters. 
Next, I investigate the impact of daughters on corporate litigation. The literature on 
corporate litigation has established that there is a significant loss in firm value when a company is 
subject to lawsuits. The loss in firm value comes not only from direct costs, such as legal penalties 
and fees but also from indirect costs, such as reputational damage, increased costs of contracting 
with suppliers, creditors, and employees (Karpoff and Lott 1993; Karpoff et al. 2008) Daughters 
have been shown to cause parents, especially their father, to adopt social-friendly views. Washington 
(2008) show that legislators who have daughter(s) hold(s) more liberal views on a number of social 
issues such as energy, environment, labor, health, and labor. Therefore, I expect that CEOs’ 
daughter(s) can reduce corporate litigation risk though lowering social related lawsuits.  
Hypothesis 2: Firms where CEOs have more daughters are less susceptive to social related corporate 
litigation then firms where CEOs have fewer daughters. 
Finally, I ask whether daughter parenting affects CEOs’ stock option exercises. I expect that 
CEOs with more daughters will exercise in-the-money options earlier than CEOs with fewer 
daughters. The purpose of this test is to identify whether the change in CEOs’ confidence in firms’ 
prospect is one channel through which CEOs’ daughter(s) affect(s) firm decisions.  
Hypothesis 3: CEOs who have more daughters exercise their in-the-money options earlier than firms 
CEOs who have fewer daughters. 
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3. Data and Sample Construction 
 
To identify whether daughter parenting experience affects CEO corporate decisions, I 
construct a CEO-firm matched panel data set. I start with the CEO sample of non-financial firms in 
ExecuComp database which gives 6,392 distinct CEOs from 2,827 companies. From ExecuComp, I 
obtain the names, gender, company joining and leaving dates, current age, and full title of the CEOs. 
To obtain information on CEOs’ family background, I search for biographical information in 
Marquis Biographies Online using different combinations of first name, last name, and company’s 
name. Marquis Biographies Online provides access to biographies of individuals who are listed in 
any Marquis Who’s Who title since 1985. A typical Who’s who biography contains information on 
the individual’s education, career, civil activities, awards and achievements, and family. In the family 
category, names of parents, spouse, children, and marriage/divorce years are listed. When a CEO is 
not found in Marquis Biographies Online, I complement this source by using information from 
Notable Name Database, company websites, SEC filings, and article search. Returned records from 
the search are verified with CEOs’ title, age, joining and leaving dates from ExecuComp. To avoid 
bias from CEOs who do not reveal their family information, I only include in my sample CEOs who 
reveal to have at least one child. My sample of CEOs consists of 1,437 executives from 1,139 firms. 
For most CEOs in my sample, the gender of children is not clearly stated by the data source. To 
identify gender, I use the website, www.babynamewizard.com, to look up for the gender commonly 
associated with each first name. In most cases, only one gender is associated with a first name. 
However, when a first name is used for both males and females, I assign the gender that more 
commonly uses the first name to the child.  
This dataset of CEOs’ children is re-matched with ExecuComp for CEOs’ compensation 
information. I then use GVKEY to match this data with Compustat in the period 1990-2012 for 
financial statement information. My final sample consists of 12,755 firm-year observations for which 
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CEOs’ number of children and their gender are available. I use Securities Data Company (SDC) 
Platinum M&A Database and SDC Platinum New Issues Database to collect information about 
acquisitions, debt and equity offerings made by the sample firms in the period 1990-2012. The data 
source for corporate litigation is from AuditAnalytics. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of all 
variables used in this paper.  
[Table 1 about here] 
The sample means for the variables used in my analysis are shown in Table 1.  The first 
column reports the means; the next four columns present values for the 10th, 50th, 90th percentiles 
and standard deviations. The last two columns show the number of observations and measure unit 
for each variable. All firm variables are winsorized at 2nd and 98th percentiles to eliminate potential 
outliers.  
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
 
Omitted variables are a major concern in the literature on managers’ characteristics. In this 
paper, as CEOs who have (a) daughter(s) are not randomly assigned to firms, I need to account for 
endogeneity issues in my empirical strategy. There are several ways that unobserved firms’ and 
CEOs’ heterogeneity can bias the estimation of the CEO characteristics on firm policies. First, there 
might be some omitted variables on the CEO level that affect both CEOs’ managing ability and the 
propensity of having (a) daughter(s). This concern is insignificant in this study partly because few 
American parents control the gender of their child(ren) (McClintock 2013). Also, I include dummy 
variables for the number of children in all my models to account for parents’ choice of family size 
which is positively correlated with the possibility of having (a) daughter(s). Conditional on the 
number of children, the gender composition of children in a family can be regarded as exogenous 
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(Bogan 2013). Moreover, using dummy variables help control for potential nonlinear effects of the 
total number of children on corporate outcomes and avoid the problem of collinearity between the 
number of children and number of daughters. 
Second, the matching between CEOs and firms is endogenous; companies and CEOs 
choose each other to match their strategy and preferences. I include firm fixed-effects to account for 
time-invariant characteristics on the firm level that may induce the firms to select CEOs with more 
or fewer daughters. I also include year fixed-effects that account for country-wide shocks that may 
bias the estimation. My results are significant with the inclusion of all these fixed-effects. The 
remaining concern comes from time-variant characteristics that are not accounted for by the fixed-
effects. I address this concern by adding to my regressions variables that control for firms’ 
heterogeneity in profitability, leverage, sale growth, asset growth and other CEO characteristics such 
as age and tenure. The equation of my regressions is as follows: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝜃𝜃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖  +  𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                  (1) 
 
where 𝑖𝑖 indexes the firm,  𝑡𝑡 denotes the year; 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the corporate outcome of interest; 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
is the (logarithm) number of CEOs’ daughters; 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡is a vector of control variables for CEO, firm, 
and transaction characteristics ( age, tenure, size, market to book, free cash flow, friendly, stock deal, 
stock return volatility, share turnover…); 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is number of children dummy variables, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖  
are firm fixed-effects, 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 are year fixed-effects.  
4.1. Announcement returns for major corporate decisions 
Hypothesis 1 states that firms with more daughters have higher abnormal announcement 
returns than firms with fewer daughters.  
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[Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 reports results of the regressions where cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of 
acquisition announcements are the dependent variable. The CARs are calculated using Fama-French 
three-factor model in the period from day -1 to day +1 and from day 0 to day +1. There are 6,654 
acquisitions for my sample firms in the period 1990-2012. I include firm fixed-effects, year fixed-
effects, and dummies for the number of children in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. The results show that CEOs’ daughter(s) positively impact the announcement returns 
of acquisitions. The coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels. An 
additional daughter increases the CARs by 0.40 and 0.27 percentage points. Compared with the 
mean returns of 0.45 and 0.46 percent, these coefficients are economically significant. This finding 
indicates that the market considers acquisitions made by CEOs with more daughters more value 
creating than those made by CEOs with fewer daughters.    
[Table 3 about here] 
I next examine announcement returns around debt issuance and equity issuance. Table 3 
reports results of the regressions for equity issuance. There are 707 seasoned equity offerings in my 
sample. The regressions have the same equation as formula (1). The results indicate that equity 
offerings are better received by the market if the CEO has more daughters. The impact for CEOs’ 
daughter(s) on announcement returns is considerable. One more daughter increases the 
announcement returns of equity offerings by 2.87 to 2.45 percentage points. The coefficients are 
significant at 5 percent level.  
[Table 4 about here] 
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Table 4 presents results of similar regressions for debt issuance. There are 2,241 debt 
offerings by firms in my sample. When the dependent variable is CAR in the period (0, +1), 
columns 2 and 4, the coefficients of CEOs’ daughter(s) are positive and statistically significant at 1 
percent level. However, when the dependent variable is CAR in the period (-1, +1), columns 1 and 
3, the coefficients of CEOs’ daughter(s) are indifferent from zero. Most of my results by far support 
the premise that CEOs’ daughter(s) increase(s) firm value in the main corporate decisions.  
4.2. Acquisition premium and post-issuance performance 
Hypothesis 1a states that firms where CEOs have more daughters offer lower acquisition 
premium than firms where CEOs have fewer daughters. For acquisitions, I propose that daughters 
increase firm value by reducing the likelihood that acquirers overpay the targets.  To test this 
proposition, I regress the acquisition premium offered by companies in my sample on acquiring 
CEOs’ daughter(s), firm characteristics, and acquisition characteristics. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Results from these regressions are reported in Table 5. When acquisition characteristics are 
not controlled for, columns 1 and 2, the coefficients for acquiring CEOs’ daughter(s) are negative 
and significant at 5 percent level. An additional daughter decreases acquisition premium by 2.93 
percentage points. The results are significant when firm fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and the 
dummies for the number of children are included. In columns 3 and 4, where acquisition 
characteristics are included in my regressions, the coefficients for acquiring CEOs’ daughter(s) are 
still negative but insignificantly different from zero. This result is not surprising because CEOs’ 
daughter(s) may affect other aspects of an acquisition such as deal attitude, payment methods, and 
acquisition purpose. These effects are then reflected in the premium which can be viewed as the 
price of a transaction. In average, the results in this table indicate that an acquiring CEO with more 
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daughters offer a lower premium than an acquiring CEO with fewer daughters. This result is evident 
that daughters increase firm value in acquisitions by reducing the likelihood that acquirers overpay 
the targets. 
Hypothesis 1b states that firms where CEOs have more daughters deliver higher post-
issuance profitability than firm where CEOs have fewer daughters. To test this proposition, I 
aggregate all proceeds from debt and equity offerings to find the total proceeds in each firm-year. 
Then, I regress the three-year average of post-issuance ROA and ROE on CEOs’ daughter(s), 
logarithms of the total proceeds, the interaction of the two previous terms, CEO and firm 
characteristics, and fixed-effects. The coefficient of the interaction term indicates whether CEOs 
with more daughters deliver higher profitability when companies offer new debts or equity.  
[Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 reports results of the regression. The coefficients of Log(Total Proceeds) are negative in 
all four specifications. The coefficient indicates that firms need time to ramp up operations and to 
generate profit from the newly raised capital. However, the coefficients of the interaction between 
Log(Total Proceeds) and CEOs’ daughter(s) are positive and significant for ROA in both three-year 
horizon and five-year horizon. For ROE, the coefficients are positive and significant at 10 percent 
level for three-year horizon and insignificant for five-year horizon. These results indicate that CEOs 
with more daughters can provide better post-issuance profitability.  
4.3. Corporate Litigation 
Hypothesis 3 states that CEOs’ daughter(s) reduce(s) the likelihood that the firms are 
involved in social related corporate litigation. I use data on corporate litigation from AuditAnalytics 
to test this hypothesis. The data provides detailed case-level information on civil litigation filed in 
federal district court. Each case belongs to one of 99 different categories indicating the subject of 
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the lawsuit. I assign cases from 39 categories such as civil rights, employment, disability law, 
environment law, and labor standards as social-related corporate litigation. Then, I construct two 
measures for corporate litigation: 1) New Cases is the number of new cases incurred in the firm year; 
2) Net Cases is the net change in the total number of cases in the firm year.  
[Table 7 about here] 
Table 7 reports results from the regressions where social related corporate litigation is the 
dependent variable. There are 1,975 firm years in the period 1990-2012. In all specifications, CEOs’ 
daughter(s) have negative and significant effects on both measures of social related corporate 
litigation. The coefficients are significant at 5 percent level when firm fixed-effects, year fixed-
effects, dummies for the number of children, firm characteristics and CEO characteristics are 
included. An additional daughter decreases the number of new cases by 0.24 and the total number of 
cases by 0.14. These results support Hypothesis 3 that CEOs’ daughter(s) reduce(s) the likelihood 
that the firms are involved in social related corporate litigation. 
4.4. Stock Option Exercise 
Hypothesis 5 states that CEOs with more daughters exercise their in-the-money options 
earlier than CEOs with fewer daughters. So far, I have shown that CEOs’ daughter(s) increase(s) 
firm value and decease(s) social related corporate litigation. Next, I propose that CEOs’ changed risk 
preference is one channel through which CEOs’ daughter(s) cause(s) the differences in corporate 
outcomes. Follow Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Huang and Kisgen (2013), I examine CEOs’ 
stock option exercises to make inference about their confidence level. The underlying assumption 
for this measure is that if a CEO wants to be exposed to the firm’s idiosyncratic risk, he or she is 
likely to be confident about the company’s growth prospects. Both papers find that overconfident 
CEOs hold in-the-money options longer.    
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Since I do not have detailed data on CEOs’ stock option portfolio as Malmendier and Tate 
(2005), I follow Campbell et al. (2011) in calculating the average moneyness of CEOs’ options for 
each year using ExecuComp data. I first find the average realizable value per option by dividing the 
total realizable value of the options, ExecuComp variable OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL, by the 
number of exercisable options, OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM. To find the average exercise price of the 
options, I subtract the average value per option from end-of-fiscal-year stock price, Compustat 
variable PRCCF. The estimated average moneyness of the option portfolio equals the average 
realizable value per option divided by the average exercise price. Rather than using 67% moneyness 
threshold as an indicator of high/low confidence level per Malmendier and Tate (2005), I use the 
estimated average moneyness directly as the dependent variable in the regression. By doing this, I 
have more variation in CEOs’ option exercise to estimate the effect. 
[Table 8 about here] 
Table 8 reports the results from the regressions for CEOs’ stock option exercises. There are 
558 firm-years in my sample for this test. I choose the sample period 2004-2010 to eliminate 
possible inconsistency in the reporting of option value prior to the implementation of FAS 123R. 
The coefficients for CEOs’ daughter(s) are negative and statistically significant at 5 percent level. 
One more daughter is associated with 36.62 percent decrease in the average moneyness of the 
CEO’s options. This is evident that daughter parenting experience makes CEOs less susceptive to 
overconfidence in their personal investment decisions.  
4.5. CEO-firm endogenous matching 
So far, I use firm fixed-effect models to account for the possibility that CEOs with 
daughters can be selected into well-performing companies. In this part of the paper, I provide 
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further evidence that the results are not driven by the endogenous matching between CEOs and 
companies. This test is based on the argument that if firms intentionally choose managers with a 
desirable characteristic, the firms should pay a premium for the characteristic. As CEOs’ first year 
compensation, especially cash compensation, is contracted before the starting date of the position, 
this premium can be observed in the first year compensation. Therefore, if firms choose CEOs with 
more daughters, there should be a positive correlation between the number of daughters and the 
first-year compensation. Nevertheless, if managers choose companies which match their 
preferences, their compensation should be discounted to reflect the additional benefit to the 
managers. In this case, there should be a negative correlation between the number of daughters and 
the first year compensation. To test this hypothesis, I regress CEOs’ first-year total compensation 
and cash compensation on CEOs’ daughter(s). I expect that the coefficients for CEOs’ daughter(s) 
are statistically insignificantly.  
[Table 9 about here] 
Results from these regressions are reported in Table 5. In columns 1 and 2, the coefficients 
for CEOs’ daughter(s) are insignificantly different from zero. The results indicate that CEOs’ 
daughter(s) are not an important factor when CEOs are matched with firms. In columns 3 and 4, I 
take a step further to test whether CEOs’ daughter(s) impact(s) CEOs’ year four compensations. 
The coefficients are positive and significant at 5 and 1 percent levels. These estimated coefficients 
suggest that rather than affecting CEO selection, CEOs’ daughter(s) affect(s) the CEOs’ actual 
performance at the firms. These results support my hypotheses that CEOs’ daughter parenting 
experience creates firm value. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Behavioral differences between genders have been shown to impact investments and 
corporate decisions. This study examines genders from a new angle which is the spreading effects of 
positive female characteristics in the corporate setting. Using offspring gender mix as a natural 
experiment, I show that daughter parenting experience makes CEOs more prudent in making 
corporate decisions. 
I investigate the impact of CEOs’ daughter(s) in various important corporate decisions. In 
acquisition setting, CEOs with more daughters enjoy better announcement returns than CEOs with 
fewer daughters. I find that the market rewards acquiring CEOs with more daughters because they 
are less likely to overpay the targets. When CEOs with more daughters decide to offer debt or 
equity, the market also better receives the decisions. A possible reason for the favorable market 
reaction is that these firms deliver higher post-issuance profitability. Besides financial decisions, I 
find that CEOs’ daughter(s) lower(s) corporate litigation risk by reducing the number of social 
related lawsuits. This finding is consistent with the impact of daughters on parents’ social-political 
views documented in sociology and political science literatures. Lastly, I test whether parenting 
daughters make CEOs less likely to be overconfident in their personal wealth decisions. I find that 
CEOs with more daughters exercise their in-the-money options earlier than their counterparts. 
These findings are most consistent with the hypothesis that parenting daughter(s) helps managers 
avoid excessive risks and makes more prudent corporate decisions.  
The limitations of my study should be noted. First, I do not have a randomized or natural 
experiment to assign CEOs to firms so that the effects can be estimated precisely. The endogenous 
matching between CEOs and companies make result inference challenging. Although fixed-effect 
models account for firms’ time-invariant heterogeneity, I cannot completely rule out possible 
omitted time-variant firm or CEO factors which determine both CEO selection and corporate 
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outcomes of interest. However, if it is the case, daughter parenting experience is still a factor 
contributing to the CEO’s ability to implement policies with positive outcomes. Second, my analysis 
cannot cover every possible corporate outcome on which the daughter parenting experience may 
impact. It is possible that CEOs with more daughters outperform in some decisions but 
underperform other decisions. Future studies could contribute stronger identification and further 
understanding about other impacts of gender factors on corporate decisions. 
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Table 1:  
Summary Statistics 
The sample is CEOs of over 50 year old and covers a period from 1990 to 2012. CAR is the cumulative 
abnormal announcement return from day -1 to day +1 and from day 0 to day +1. Acquisition Premium is the 
difference between acquirers' offer price and the targets' stock price before the announcements divided by 
targets’ stock price before the announcements. Toehold is a dummy that equals 1 if the acquirer holds a 
minority interest position (less than 50%) in the target’s stock before the announcement. Stock Deal is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the fraction of equity value as a payment method in the deal exceeds 50%. 
Public Target is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target is a publicly listed firm. Diversifying is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the acquirer and the target are not from the same SIC industry. Hostile, Contested, 
Tender, and Merger of Equals are dummy variables that equal 1 if the takeover is unsolicited or unfriendly, has 
multiple bidders, is a tender offer, and is classified as merger of equals by SDC, respectively. 
Statistics Mean 10th % 50th % 90th % S.D. N Unit
Age 59.06 52.00 58.00 67.00 6.11 1437 Years
Tenure 9.06 1.00 6.00 21.00 8.73 1437 Years
Male 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.11 1437
Number of Daughters 1.40 0.00 1.00 3.00 1.07 1437 Child
Number of Children 2.88 2.00 3.00 4.00 1.21 1437 Child
CAR (-1,+1) 0.45% -4.06% 0.27% 5.33% 4.84% 6854
CAR (0,1) 0.46% -3.32% 0.25% 4.70% 4.26% 6854
Acquisition Premium 16.00% -6.11% 3.15% 55.50% 38.80% 1239
Friendly 0.78 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.42 6854
Toehold 0.66 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.47 6854
Stock Deal 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 6854
Public Target 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.46 6854
Diversify 0.59 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 6854
Contested 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 6854
Tender 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 6854
Merge of Equals 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 6854
Debt and Equity Issuance:
Equity Return Volatility 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02
Share Turnover 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
Net Proceeds (Equity) 276 17 125 700 518 782 US$ million
Net Proceeds (Debt) 727 20 249 1,450 2,560 2717 US$ million
Firm Characteristics:
Market Value 9,074 239 1,890 22,495 24,012 8203 US$ million
Market to Book 1.63 0.64 1.17 3.01 1.84 8194
Free Cash Flow 0.22 0.03 0.19 0.44 0.18 7918 US$ million
Sales Growth 1.13 0.91 1.07 1.34 0.69 7905
Leverage 0.38 0.01 0.37 0.69 0.27 8432
Cash to Assets 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.27 0.13 8432
PPE 1,989 28 394 5,916 3,865 8482 US$ million
CaPex to Asset 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.06 7918
Asset Growth 1.14 0.92 1.06 1.37 0.42 7909
CEO Characteristics:
Acquisition:
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Table 2: 
Announcement returns for acquisitions 
The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal announcement return (CAR). The sample is CEOs of 
over 50 year old and covers a period from 1990 to 2012. Toehold is a dummy that equals 1 if the acquirer holds 
a minority interest position (less than 50%) in the target’s stock before the announcement. Stock Deal is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the fraction of equity value as a payment method in the deal exceeds 50%. 
Public Target is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target is a publicly listed firm. Diversifying is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the acquirer and the target are not from the same SIC industry. Hostile, Contested, 
Tender, and Merger of Equals are dummy variables that equal 1 if the takeover is unsolicited or unfriendly, has 
multiple bidders, is a tender offer, and is classified as merger of equals by SDC, respectively. Standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level and shown in the blankets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
VARIABLES CAR (-1,+1) CAR (0,1) CAR (-1,+1) CAR (0,1)
Number of Daughters 0.0040*** 0.0027**
(0.001) (0.001)
Log(number of daughters) 0.0125*** 0.0083**
(0.004) (0.004)
Age -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.0001 0.0001 0.0070 0.0070
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Size -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0004 0.0004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Market to Book 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Free Cash Flow 0.0130** 0.0130** 0.0124** 0.0124**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Sales Growth -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0022
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Friendly -0.0089*** -0.0089*** -0.0089*** -0.0089***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Toehold -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Stock Deal -0.0080** -0.0080** -0.0101*** -0.0101***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Public Target -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0022 -0.0022
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Diversifying -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0027* -0.0027*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Contested -0.0113* -0.0113* -0.0072 -0.0072
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Tender 0.0083** 0.0083** 0.0056 0.0056
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Merge of Equals 0.0262 0.0262 0.0173 0.0173
(0.026) (0.026) (0.014) (0.014)
Firm Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Children Dummie Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,654 6,654 6,654 6,654
Number of gvkey 655 655 655 655
Adj. R-squared 0.0095 0.0132 0.0095 0.0132
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Table 3: 
Announcement returns for debt issuance 
The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal announcement return (CAR). The sample is CEOs of 
over 50 year old and covers a period from 1990 to 2012. Equity Return Volatility is the standard deviation of 
daily stock return during the trading period (-90, -11) prior to the announcement date (trading day 0). Share 
Turnover is the ratio of average daily share trading volume during the trading period (-90, -11) prior to the 
announcement date (trading day 0) divided by pre-issuance total shares outstanding. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level and shown in the blankets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
VARIABLES CAR (-1,+1) CAR (0,+1) CAR (-1,+1) CAR (0,+1)
Number of Daughters -0.0018 0.0055***
(0.002) (0.002)
Log(number of daughters) -0.0050 0.0154***
(0.005) (0.006)
Age -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.0085 0.0023 -0.0085 0.0023
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Size 0.0018 0.0010 0.0018 0.0010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Market to Book -0.0006 0.0028 -0.0006 0.0028
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Free Cash Flow 0.0111 0.0221* 0.0111 0.0221*
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Sales Growth 0.0125* 0.0185** 0.0125* 0.0185**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
ROA -0.0332 -0.0676 -0.0332 -0.0676
(0.039) (0.044) (0.039) (0.044)
PPE 0.0003 -0.0129 0.0003 -0.0129
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Equity Return Volatility 0.2733 -0.1002 0.2733 -0.1002
(0.271) (0.197) (0.271) (0.197)
Share Turnover 0.3369 0.7533 0.3369 0.7533
(0.422) (0.511) (0.422) (0.511)
Log(Net Proceeds) 0.0001 0.0006 0.0001 0.0006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Children Dummie Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,241 2,241 2,241 2,241
Number of gvkey 409 409 409 409
Adj. R-squared 0.0052 0.0077 0.0052 0.0077
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Table 4: 
Announcement returns for equity issuance 
The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal announcement return (CAR). The sample is CEOs of 
over 50 year old and covers a period from 1990 to 2012. Equity Return Volatility is the standard deviation of 
daily stock return during the trading period (-90, -11) prior to the announcement date (trading day 0). Share 
Turnover is the ratio of average daily share trading volume during the trading period (-90, -11) prior to the 
announcement date (trading day 0) divided by pre-issuance total shares outstanding. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level and shown in the blankets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
VARIABLES CAR (-1,+1) CAR (0,+1) CAR (-1,+1) CAR (0,+1)
Number of Daughters 0.0287** 0.0245**
(0.012) (0.010)
Log(number of daughters) 0.0714** 0.0609**
(0.030) (0.024)
Age -0.0016 -0.0020* -0.0016 -0.0020*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure -0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Male 0.0092 -0.0190 0.0092 -0.0190
(0.042) (0.025) (0.042) (0.025)
Size 0.0162 0.0142 0.0162 0.0142
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
Market to Book 0.0023 -0.0038 0.0023 -0.0038
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Free Cash Flow -0.0352 -0.0216 -0.0352 -0.0216
(0.024) (0.016) (0.024) (0.016)
Sales Growth 0.0225 0.0051 0.0225 0.0051
(0.016) (0.008) (0.016) (0.008)
ROA 0.1037 0.1247* 0.1037 0.1247*
(0.094) (0.069) (0.094) (0.069)
PPE -0.0406 -0.0015 -0.0406 -0.0015
(0.041) (0.036) (0.041) (0.036)
Equity Return Volatility -0.0709 -0.1754 -0.0709 -0.1754
(0.410) (0.389) (0.410) (0.389)
Share Turnover -0.9064 0.0055 -0.9064 0.0055
(1.027) (0.707) (1.027) (0.707)
Log(Net Proceeds) -0.0018 -0.0027 -0.0018 -0.0027
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Firm Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Children Dummie Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 707 707 707 707
Number of gvkey 322 322 322 322
Adj. R-squared 0.1240 0.1447 0.1240 0.1447
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Table 5: 
Acquisition Premium 
The dependent variable in the regressions is the acquisition premium. The sample is CEOs of over 50 
year old and covers a period from 1990 to 2012. Toehold is a dummy that equals 1 if the acquirer holds a 
minority interest position (less than 50%) in the target’s stock before the announcement. Stock Deal is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the fraction of equity value as a payment method in the deal exceeds 50%. 
Public Target is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target is a publicly listed firm. Diversifying is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the acquirer and the target are not from the same SIC industry. Hostile, Contested, 
Tender, and Merger of Equals are dummy variables that equal 1 if the takeover is unsolicited or unfriendly, 
has multiple bidders, is a tender offer, and is classified as merger of equals by SDC, respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and shown in the blankets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
VARIABLES
Acquisition            
Premium
Acquisition            
Premium
Acquisition            
Premium
Acquisition            
Premium
Number of Daughters -0.0270** -0.0112
(0.013) (0.011)
Log(number of daughters) -0.0629* -0.0302
(0.032) (0.026)
Age -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0009 -0.0009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Male 0.0377 0.0421 0.0600 0.0628
(0.053) (0.052) (0.050) (0.049)
Size 0.0188* 0.0191* -0.0179* -0.0178*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Market to Book -0.0031 -0.0032 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Sales Growth 0.0183 0.0169 -0.0056 -0.0065
(0.036) (0.036) (0.024) (0.024)
Friendly 0.2071*** 0.2066***
(0.046) (0.046)
Stock Deal 0.0139 0.0139
(0.027) (0.027)
Public Target 0.0343 0.0349
(0.044) (0.044)
Diversifying 0.0793 0.0782
(0.166) (0.165)
Contested 0.1395*** 0.1393***
(0.042) (0.042)
Tender 0.1526** 0.1526**
(0.069) (0.069)
Merge of Equals 0.1400*** 0.1400***
(0.035) (0.035)
Industry Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Children Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,367 1,367 1,367 1,367
Adj. R-squared 0.0800 0.0806 0.2406 0.2409
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Table 6: 
Post-Issuance Performance 
The dependent variable is the 3-year and 5-year average of Return on Assets and Return on 
Equity after debt issuance. The sample is CEOs of over 50 year old and covers firms that issue debt 
or equity in the period from 1990 to 2012. Log(Total Proceeds) is the total proceeds from debt and 
equity offerings aggregated in each firm year. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
shown in the blankets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES ROA (t+1,t+3) ROA (t+1,t+5) ROE (t+1,t+3) ROE (t+1,t+5)
Daughters × Log(Total Proceeds 0.0014** 0.0025*** 0.0064* 0.0040
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Daughters -0.0061 -0.0118 -0.0238 -0.1379
(0.006) (0.012) (0.026) (0.100)
Log(Total Proceeds) -0.0029*** -0.0041** -0.0074* -0.0045
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Age -0.0060*** -0.0048 -0.0036 0.0535
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.057)
Tenure 0.0066*** 0.0081* 0.0023 -0.0607
(0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.065)
Male 0.0702*** -0.1124*** 0.0792 -0.3378
(0.018) (0.034) (0.078) (0.215)
Size 0.0031 -0.0084 -0.0144 -0.0287*
(0.010) (0.008) (0.018) (0.017)
Firm Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Children Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,118 1,118 1,116 1,116
Number of gvkey 223 223 223 223
Adj. R-squared 0.0384 0.0401 0.0366 0.0417
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Table 7: 
Social Related Corporate Litigation 
The dependent variable is the number of new civil lawsuits, and the net change in civil lawsuits. 
The sample is CEOs of over 50 year old and covers a period from 1990 to 2012. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level and shown in the blankets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
VARIABLES
New Civil 
Lawsuits
New Civil 
Lawsuits
Net Civil 
Lawsuits
Net Civil 
Lawsuits
Number of Daughters -0.2414** -0.1378**
(0.094) (0.066)
Log(number of daughters) -0.4927** -0.2787**
(0.194) (0.122)
Age -0.3952 -0.4047 -0.6796* -0.6848*
(0.409) (0.409) (0.356) (0.356)
Tenure -0.0866 -0.0865 0.0392 0.0391
(0.063) (0.064) (0.060) (0.061)
Male 0.0066 0.0070 0.0134 0.0137
(0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
Size 0.1677*** 0.1690*** -0.0075 -0.0068
(0.064) (0.065) (0.057) (0.057)
Market to Book 0.6301 0.6512 0.6642 0.6777
(0.652) (0.650) (0.657) (0.657)
PP&E -0.0209 -0.0206 -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.023) (0.022) (0.014) (0.014)
CaPex to Assets 0.0215 0.0203 0.0076 0.0070
(0.022) (0.021) (0.014) (0.014)
Firm Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Children Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,975 1,975 1,975 1,975
Number of gvkey 512 512 512 512
Adj. R-squared 0.0805 0.0802 0.0469 0.0468
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Table 8: 
Stock Option Exercise 
The dependent variable is the average moneyness of CEOs' stock options. The sample is CEOs 
of over 50 year old and covers a period from 2004 to 2010. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level and shown in the blankets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
VARIABLES Average Moneyness Average Moneyness
Number of Daughters -0.3662**
(0.162)
Log(number of daughters) -0.7573**
(0.334)
Age 0.0898*** 0.0639***
(0.022) (0.016)
Tenure -0.0962*** -0.0619***
(0.016) (0.016)
Male 2.7968** 2.7968**
(1.185) (1.185)
Sales Growth -0.0699 -0.0699
(0.083) (0.083)
Size 0.8607*** 0.8607***
(0.313) (0.313)
Market to Book 0.2374 0.2374
(0.159) (0.159)
PPE -0.3982** -0.3982**
(0.177) (0.177)
CaPex to Assets 0.6675 0.6675
(1.352) (1.352)
Constant -8.8236*** -7.6584***
(2.216) (1.785)
Firm Fixed-Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes
Number of Children Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 558 558
Number of Gvkey 189 189
Adj. R-squared 0.4490 0.4490
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Table 9: 
Offspring gender in CEO-Firm Matching 
 The dependent variable is the total compensation and cash compensation in year 1 and year 
4 of the CEO tenure. Total Compensation is the logarithms of total cash and stock-based 
compensation, variable tdc1 in ExecuComp. Cash Compensation is the logarithms of salary and bonus, 
variable total_curr in ExecuComp. The sample is CEOs of over 50 year old and covers a period 
from 1992 to 2012. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and shown in the blankets. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES
Total 
Compensation 
Year 1
Cash 
Compensation 
Year 1
Total 
Compensation 
Year 4
Cash 
Compensation 
Year 4
Number of Daughters 0.0815 0.1780 0.2144** 0.3097***
(0.265) (0.214) (0.103) (0.097)
Age -0.1136*** -0.0572 -0.0311 -0.0213
(0.042) (0.035) (0.021) (0.022)
Firm Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Children Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 326 332 417 419
Number of gvkey 295 302 375 377
Adj. R-squared 0.7950 0.8654 0.8786 0.8971
